Volume 63 — Wisconsin Reports

<p>ERROR to tbe Circuit Court for Racine County.</p>

The facts will sufficiently appear from tbe opinion. There Was a verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

This is aii action in equity, brought by the plaintiff, a stockholder in the defendant corporation, to obtain the cancellation of certain stock alleged to have been illegally issued by such corporation, and for an injunction. The corporation defendant demurred separately to the complaint, and this appeal is from an order overruling such demurrer.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Milwcndcee County.</p>

The facts will sufficiently appear from the opinion. There was a special verdict finding, among other things, that the assignment was not made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing the garnishee proceedings.

The appeal is from an order made upon the hearing of an intervening petition filed by the appellant, Joseph M. Pease, in an action between E. D. Davis and Ezra Michel - backer for the dissolution of a partnership, etc. The following statement of the case was prepared by Mr. Justice Taylor as a part of the opinion: The facts out of which the contention between the parties to- this appeal arises, are briefly as follows: On and before July 30, 1884, E. D. Davis and Ezra…

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: “ This action is to recover, the value of certain personal property claimed by the plaintiff under and by virtue of a bill of sale to her from her husband, Erancis C. Evans, alleged to have been taken and converted by the defendant. The defendant admitted the taking and conversion, but justified under a writ of attachment, judgment, and execution in favor of the creditors of the husband.

This appeal is from an order of the circuit court denying the motion of the appellants, made after judgment, to open the judgment, and for leave to defend the action. The action was brought under sec. 1191, B.. S., against the appellants and over 100 other defendants, to bar the original owners of over 120 distinct parcels of land, der scribed in a certain tax deed executed by the county of Lincoln to the plaintiff, of all their right, title, interest, or claim in such lands.

Tbe following statement of the case was prepared by Mr. Justice Taylor as a part of the opinion: This is an appeal from a judgment in an action of ejectment. The case was tried by the court without a jury. No bill óf exceptions was settled in the case, and the only question in the case is whéther the pleadings and the findings of fact support the judgment in the case.

Action to foreclose a mortgage alleged to have been executed by the defendant company to secure the payment of a note made by it for $10,000, dated May 15, 1882, payable to Eogers & Co, one year after date. The complaint alleges the assignment of the note and mortgage to the plaintiff, for value, on or about February 8, 1883.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of an offense under sec. 4605, R. S. The facts will sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Tbe case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: This is an action of ejectment, commenced September 7, 1874, by tbe plaintiff, as tbe widow of Lewis Williams, Sr., for dower of an undivided one-third of 260 acres of land in Kenosha county, and damages for withholding the same. The answer denies that she was ever such widow, or the wife of the deceased.

- Upon' an affidavit, the substance of which, is stated in the opinion, the plaintiff applied for a writ of certiormri to the city clerk, to bring up for review the proceedings of the board of review of the city of Milwaukee. The clerk appeared and waived the issuance of the writ, and it was stipulated that the facts stated in the affidavit were true.

In 1866 one Orestes Garrison, who was then the owner of the premises occupied by the parties to this action, conveyed to the plaintiff Lyon a certain mill property and water power situated on a slough of the Wisconsin river in Wood •county, such slough lying to the west of the main channel of the river and being separated therefrom by an island.

<p> Railroads: Master and servant: Negligence of fellow-servants: Regulation as to warning of danger: Custom: Evidence. </p> <p>1. Where a railroad company had provided watchmen to guard an employee from danger while at work under a car, it is not hable to him for an injury resulting from their failure to warn him of an approaching train, which struck such car and pushed it over him.</p> <p>2. A special finding of the jury that it was not a rule or custom of the company, imposed by it on its employees, that they should watch for the safety of then- fellow-workmen in positions of danger, is held to be unsupported by the evidence.</p>

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendants appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. They contended, inter alia, that street cars were included in the term “ carriages.” In Taylor v. Goodwin, 28 Eng. (Moak), Y48, a bicycle was held to be a carriage. The street cars having been taken by the appellants at the owner’s risk, there could be no recovery unless it was at least shown that the injury resulted from appellants’ negligence.

Tbe case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Oassoday : “ Tbis is an action against tbe defendant, as a common carrier, for damages for tbe loss of goods burned up in its passenger depot, at Hastings, Minnesota.

This was an action brought by a tenant to reform a three years’ lease of a store building in the city of Milwaukee. On the trial the defendant objected to the admission of any evidence under the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The objection was overruled and after a trial by the court judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the relief demanded. The defendant appealed.

The complaint states four separate causes of action based upon promissory notes made by the defendants to the plaintiffs, and a fifth for merchandise sold and delivered. The facts stated in the answer as a defense to the action: upon the notes will sufficiently appear from the opinion. As to the fifth cause of action the answer alleged payment.

This action was brought before a justice of the peace and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant thereupon appealed to the county court. The notice of appeal is in due form, and is entitled in the action.

3. Upon contracts made by an executor or administrator, in the discharge of his duties as such, he is hable personally, and his liability does not depend upon the fact that he has assets in his hands sufficient to discharge the debts so incurred; and the judgment, if any be recovered, is to be satisfied out of his property, and not out of the estate of the deceased.

<p> Evidence: Employment and value of services of expert hook-keeper. </p> <p>1. The evidence in this case is held to warrant a finding that the plaintiff was employed by defendants as an expert book-keeper and was entitled to compensation accordingly.</p> <p>2. The issue being as to the value of services in correcting mistakes in defendants’ books, it was not error to exclude a question asked on behalf of defendants: “Is not every mercantile concern liable to get its books out of balance a few dollars? ” Nor was it error to exclude a letter written by plaintiff and which had been shown to ■defendants before they employed him, in which.he speaks of his poverty and asks assistance in finding employment.</p>

Tbe case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: “ This is an action by sureties against the executrix of a co-surety for contribution, commenced March 29, 1883.

This was an action of replevin brought to recover certain personal property consisting of books, maps, plats, and papers, used in making abstracts of title.

This action was brought .to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, who was struck by a moving car on the Wisconsin Central Railroad, at the village of Spencer, on September 26, 1881. The defendant Stewart was not served with process, and made no appear-anee to the action.

Action on a’ policy of insurance against loss by fire. The plaintiff Body owned and occupied premises in Clintonville, Waupaca county, Wisconsin. The plaintiff Lcmson held a mortgage on the property. In December, 1883, Body applied to one Philipps, who was the local agent at Clintonville for three insurance companies, but not of the defendant company, for $6,000 insurance upon such buildings and their contents.

Tbe following statement of tbe case was prepared by Mr. Justice Taylor as a part of tbe opinion: Tbis is an appeal from tbe judgment of tbe circuit court of Green Lake county, reversing tbe order of tbe county court of Dodge county, admitting to probate tbe will of Margaret Armstrong, deceased.

<p> Practice: Notice of application for judgment: Judgment signed by clerk: Terms of court. </p> <p>An. action pending in the circuit court for Green Lake county was argued and submitted and taken under advisement by the court, and at a subsequent term a decision of the issues in favor of the plaintiff was announced, but tbe court, not being sufficiently advised as to tbe value of certain improvements, referred the matter to a commissioner to take proofs. Subsequently, at a term of tbe circuit court for Winnebago county, commencing September 2, which was also a special term for Green Lake county, the plaintiff moved for judgment, and it was agreed between counsel for the respective parties that the motion should be argued and decided at some túne to be fixed by them, before October 1, for the reason that the judge who tried the case was to resign and leave the bench on that date. The term of court was adjourned on September 19, without day. No time of bringing the motion to a hearing having been agreed upon, and no notice having been given by either party, the plaintiff, on the 30th day of September, appeared at the judge’s chambers in Winnebago county, andwithout argument moved for judgment. The judge thereupon made his findings and directed the clerk to enter judgment upon them, which was accordingly done. Held:</p> <p>(1) Under the circumstances it was not irregular to move for judgment without further notice.</p> <p>(2) Under ch. 61, Laws of 1883 (providing that the terms of the circuit court for Winnebago county shall be special terms for the other counties in the same circuit), and ch. 61, Laws of 1879 (providing that such court shall be deemed open for the transaction of business from the commencement of one regular term to the commencement of another), the findings were properly made and judgment was properly ordered by the court, and entered and signed by the clerk on September 30, although the general term had adjourned.</p>

Justice Cassoday : “ The railroad company filed its petition under sec. 1852, R. S., to have the rights aud interests of the parties to the proceedings ascertained and determined, and that if,-upon such determination, it should appear that the petitioner had not acquired or perfected full title to the land in question, then that proceedings be had to condemn the same, etc. The respondent, John, Strcmge, counterclaimed, and prayed condemnation and compensation. “ On the…

Tbe case is sufficiently stated in tbe opinion. Tbe defendant Wolfenden appealed from a judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff for tbe amount due upon tbe notes. Besides tbe cases cited in tbe opinion, they cited, to tbe point that tbe detriment or inconvenience to tbe defendants was a sufficient consideration for the bond: laythoarp v. Bryant, S Scott, 250; Hemes V. Smith, 2 Lev. 122; Sturbyn v. Albany, Oro. Eliz. 01; Will&inson v. Olmevru, 1 Bing.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Kewaunee County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This is an action in equity in the nature of a creditors’ suit. The material facts in the case are as follows: October 81, 1883, the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the circuit court against the defendant Hugh Monaham, and his son, Charles S. Monahan, for about $400. Execution was immediately issued thereon, which was returned unsatisfied, November 22, 1883.

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Fond du Lae County.</p> <p>The facts, so far as they are essential to an understanding of the points decided, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Fond du Lao County.</p> <p>Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion. Tbe plaintiff appealed from tbe judgment dismissing tbe complaint.</p>

<p>Tax certificate — Cancellation by county board — I/imitation.</p> <p>Under ch. 112, Laws of 1867, as amended by ch. 56, Laws of 1868, the time within which an action could be commenced against a county to recover the amount paid for a tax certificate issued upon a void sale, and also the time within which the county board might cancel such certificate, refund the money, and reassess the amount upon the property originally charged therewith, was limited to six years from the date of the tax sale, except in the special cases mentioned in those statutes. But ch. 144, Laws of 1874, extended such time to six years from the time when a deed became due upon the certificate; and this last-mentioned act applied to certificates theretofore as well as to those thereafter issued.</p>

• Action to recover damages for a failure to deliver a quantity of grass-seed under a written contract. The answer, besides a general denial, contained a counterclaim for tbe price of certain seed delivered under tbe contract, and a further counterclaim for overweight taken by tbe plaintiff on delivery, amounting to twenty-eight bushels at $2 per bushel. The contract and tbe facts appearing in evidence are stated in. tbe opinion.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: “ This action was brought to restrain the city from opening a culvert across Everett.street, on the south line of Second street, and from attempting to carry or drain the waters from the east side of Everett street down along the south line of Second street in front of the property of the plaintiff McDonald. The issues were joined, and the cause tried by the court, which made and filed the following findings: “£ 1.

This was a proceeding by mandamus- to compel the board of education to reinstate the son of the relator in one of the public schools of the city of Fond du Lac. The substance of the return to the alternative writ will be found in the opinion.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from an order sustaining the demurrer of the defendant Pierron to the complaint. The case made by the complaint is this: June 21, 1882, the city of Fond du Lac recovered judgment for over $31,000 against John Hughes, James Gaynor, Charles B. Bartlett, Robert A. Baker, the plaintiff M. D. Moore, and the defendant Leon Lallier.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Oassoday: “ This is an action to foreclose a bill of sale given to secure future advances of money, and claimed to be a chattel mortgage. The makers made default.

This action was commenced before a justice of tbe peace. Tbe complaint is for a balance of account for goods sold, for labor and services, and for moneys bad and received, paid, laid out, and expended. Judgment is demanded for $200. No dates or specific amounts are given. Tbe answer is a general denial, payment, and settlement in 1870, showing a balance due tbe defendant of $6.75.

REPORTED from, the Circuit Court for Milwaulcee Countj. The case is stated in the opinion. The offense .charged is a statutory one, and the words “ not adjoining,” etc., being descriptive of the offense must be pleaded. Sec. 4109, R. S., is first found as sec. 11, p. 352, Terr.

This action was commenced in April, 1880, under the mill-dam act, to recover damages for the flowage of land.

Action to recover the sum of $62,500, the amount of royalties alleged to be due under a written agreement. The contract as set out in the complaint was dated December 24, 1815, and was alleged to'have been made for the purpose of consolidating several previous agreements. It recites, among other things, that on September 26,1870, the plaintiff, James 8.

Habeas Coepus. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion. to the point that tbe writ of habeas corpus would lie in this case, cited In re Perry, 30 Wis. 288; In re Blai/r, 4 id. 521; In re Tarble, 25 id. 397; Bx pcvrte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Orogyper v. Oomm. 2 Robt. (Ya.), 842; Miller v. Snyder, 6 Ind. 1; Perry v. State, 41 Tex. 488; Hdlma/n v. Austi/n, 34 id. 668; People v. Lisaomh, 60 N. Y. 559.

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Columbia, County.</p> <p>Tbe case is sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Fond du Lao County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action to recover damages on account of the death of plaintiff’s intestate, and was brought against the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, and John Stewart and Fdwin U. Abbot, trustees. The allegations of the complaint will sufficiently appear from the opinion. The. defendant Abbot separately interposed a general demurrer, and from an order sustaining that demurrer the plaintiff appealed.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: “ The complaint alleges that defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for work, labor, services, goods, wares, merchandise, cash, and farm products, done, performed, sold, and delivered to the defendant during 1879, 1880, and 1881, at defendant’s request, amounting in all to $309.85, for which judgment was demanded.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff, a married woman, in 1872 purchased certain premises in the city of Appleton and has since occupied them as her homestead; that on October 27, 1881, there were three mortgages on said property upon which there was due and unpaid about $1,880; that her husband was then indebted to the defendant Reeve and one Hutchinson in the sum, as they claimed, of about $680, and that he was unable to pay or secure said debts; that his said…

This action was brought against the present defendant and one John Furlong, in 1817, to recover damages for the alleged wrongful tearing down of a certain dock or wharf of the plaintiffs, situated in the waters of Washington harbor, in the county of Door, and for the wrongful conversion of the materials of which it was composed.

<p> Ejectment: Land talcen by railroad. </p> <p>If the owner of land has expressly or impliedly consented to the construction of a railroad across the same, he cannot thereafter maintain an action to recover possession of the land so taken and occupied.</p>

The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion. To the point that the facts showed a sale, counsel for the appellant cited Riohcvrdson v. Obnstead, 14 Ill. 213; Benjamin on Sales, secs. 81, 328; Bigler v. Hall, 54 N. Y. 107; Bahilly v. Wilson, 3 Dill. 420; Lonergan v. Stewart, 55 Ill. 44; Johnston v. Browne, 87 Iowa, 200; For-ton v. Wood/ruff, 2 N. Y. 155; Hilliard on Sales, 17; MoOon-nellv. Hughes, 29 Wis. 537.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: “ Mcmdamus. The defendants made return or answer to the relation, and the relator replied to the return.

Action to have a lien upon land under and by virtue of the purchase thereof at an execution sale, established against the claims of the defendant to said land. The substance of the complaint and the facts, as found by the trial court, are stated in the opinion. The action for a divorce, therein, referred to, by the plaintiff against her husband, was com-mencecl in June, 1880, and the judgment therein was rendered September 19, 1881.

The action is replevin, and was originally brought before a justice of the peace, who gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant attempted to appeal to the circuit court. The notice of appeal is not signed by any person, and the return of the justice fails to show who presented the same to him. The circuit court denied a motion of plaintiff to dismiss the appeal because of the above defect in the notice.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Taylok: “ This action was commenced by James T. Leonard in his life-time against the appellant, James M. Leonard,, for the strict foreclosure of a contract for the sale of certain real estate, the title to which was vested in said Jamos T. Leonard, and the possession of which was held by James M. Leonard, appellant.

<p> Municipal subscription to railroad stock:: Who may sign petition, etc. </p> <p>1. Under sec. 940, R. S. (providing for the acceptance through a petition of the tax-payers of a municipality of the proposition of a railroad company for a subscription to its stock), the persons resident in the municipality on the day when the petition may ürst be presented, and whose property was assessed for taxation on the last assessment roll (although their names may not appear on such roll), except idiots, insane persons, and minors, are those entitled to sign such petition. [Whether the guardian of an idiot, insane person, or minor, to whom the property of his ward was assessed, may sign the petition, is not determined:]</p> <p>2. But in determining whether the petition has been signed by a majority of the tax-payers so resident, idiots, insane persons, and minors are to be counted.</p>

The appeal is by the defendant Philo Borden from an order refusing to set aside a judgment by default, and also from the judgment itself. The facts will sufficiently appear from the opinion. To the point that the service of the summons in this case was valid, they cited Farmers’ Ins. Go. v. Highsmith, 44 Iowa, 330; Gwynne on Sheriffs, 77; Morton-v. Meader, 4 Sawy. 603; Slaght v. Bobbins, 13 N. J. Law, 340.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Oassoday : “ This action was commenced in justice’s court to recover the balance of an alleged indebtedness of $164 from the defendant to the plaintiff, for work and labor of the plaintiff, his team, and wife during the years 1881 and 1882, and for 100 pounds of corn meal.

The action is upon the alleged official bond of the defendant Hutchens, as town treasurer of the plaintiff town for the year 1883. The other defendants are the sureties in such bond. The breach assigned is the failure of such treasurer to pa}*- over to his successor in office, on due demand, certain moneys belonging to the town, which came to his hands as treasurer. The complaint contains a copy of such bond and sufficiently alleges the breach of the condition thereof.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Qrcunt County.</p>

Action to recover tbe purchase price of lumber alleged to have been furnished to the defendant. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. They contended, inter aUa, that the appellant did not own the premises at the time of his alleged promise; that the relinquishment of the lien did not inure to his advantage; and that, therefore, his promise, if made, was void for want of consideration.

Action to recover the amount due upon a note and mortgage, it being alleged that the defendants, by wilfully cutting and removing the timber from the mortgaged premises, bad rendered the same worthless, and that the mortgagor was insolvent. The facts, as found by the trial court, are stated in the opinion.

The husband, of the plaintiff (since deceased) delivered to the defendant for collection a promissory note, given by a party -in Iowa, for $100, and interest, payable to the plaintiff. The defendant collected the note, and gave the husband credit for the amount in an account against the latter of a manufacturing company, of which the defendant was secretary.

'APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Portage Comity. Action to recover a balance alleged to be due upon a contract for the manufacture of five sets of logging sleds by fbe plaintiff for the defendant.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Portage County.</p> <p>The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.</p>

On January 30, 1813, the defendant Horace Meriam executed to the plaintiff’s intestate his promissory note of that date for $1,000, due one year after date, with ten per cent, interest. To secure the payment of such note, Meriam and his wife executed to the payee their mortgage of the same date on certain real estate in the city of Berlin. The consideration of said mortgage was stated therein to be “ one thousand,” — the word dollars being omitted therefrom.

The action is to set aside a judgment obtained by tbe defendants Fronte Clifford and John W. Clifford against school district No. 1 in the town of Magnolia, and to restrain the collection of a tax to pay such judgment. The cause was before the court on a former appeal (55 Wis. 161), and from the report thereof and from the opinion herein the facts will sufficiently appear.

The facts are stated in the opinion. To the point that notice was not necessary to the appointment of a successor to a deceased trustee, they cited Holden v. W. Y. c& E. Bamlt, 12 N. Y. 286; In re Robmson, 31 id. 261; Perry on Trusts, sec. 282.

<p>ERROR to the Circuit Court for Saule County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>They contended, inter alia, that sec. 4387, R. S., was derived from the state of New York, and has been there so construed that to constitute an offense .thereunder the act must be committed with the specific intent to do one of the things there enumerated. See 2 R. S. of 27. Y. (2d ed.), 553; 3 id. (7th ed.), 2477; Nash v. Benedict, 25 "Wend. 645; People v. Merrill, 2 Parker’s Or. R. 595, 604; 8. O. 14 FT. Y. 75; ■Madden v. People, 25 id. 373. "When a particular intent is essential to constitute a crime that intent must be distinctly alleged in the indictment or information. 1 Whart. Or. Law, sec. 297; State v. Card,, 34 27. H. 515; People v. Loh-mwi, 2 Barb. 216; Gale v. State, 1 Eng. (Ark.), 519; Mormon v. State, 24 Miss. 54; Comm. v. Morse, 2 Mass. 128; Comm. v. Slack, 19 Pick. 304.</p>

-APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Qrcrnt County. Action to foreclose a mortgage given by tbe defendants to secure tbe payment of a promissory note made by tbe defendant Jmies Homey for $1,000, dated November 10, 1877, payable on or before ten years from tbe date thereof, with interest at tbe rate of ten per cent, per annum, payable annually.

This is an action of trover, brought to recover the value of certain promissory notes, alleged to have been unlawfully detained by the defendant bank from the plaintiff. The notes originally belonged to H. S. Benjamin, who assigned his interest therein to the plaintiff company.

<p> (1) Agency coupled with an interest: Termination: Receiver: Settlement of business: Payment of debts incurred. (#) Method of sale by receiver, whether as a whole or in parcels. </p> <p>1. There being.no proof of bad faith on the part of the defendants, or of any negligence in the conduct of the business, and the rights of the respective parties therein having been open to reasonable doubt, the contract relations between the parties — by virtue of which, as determined on the former appeal (58 Wis. 56), the plaintiff was the owner of the business and the defendants carried it on as his agents with a right to become the owners thereof upon payment of the moneys advanced by the plaintiff and certain amounts of interest and allowances for the use of his credit, etc.— are held to have subsisted after the commencement of this action to determine the rights of the parties and until such rights were so determined and a receiver appointed; and until that time the defendants, in conducting the business, are held to have acted as the agents of the plaintiff as fully as before the commencement of the action, except that, after being forbidden by the plaintiff, they had no right to use his credit or make him personally hable for debts incurred in carrying on the business. In the closing up and settlement of the business, therefore, all debts fairly incurred by the defendants in carrying it on, up to the time of the appointment of the receiver, should be paid out of the assets of the business before the payment to the plaintiff of the moneys advanced by him.</p> <p>2. A direction of the court below to the receiver of a large manufacturing business to sell the business and all the personal property belonging thereto as a whole, including raw material, finished products, and ah the debts due to the business, is held to be erroneous as not calculated to produce the most money or be most advantageous to ah parties interested.</p>

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Hacine County.</p> <p>The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.</p>

Tbe complaint alleges that on December 21, 1878, the plaintiff loaned the defendant $5,000, to be used, and which was used, in the business of Eish Bros. & Co., in which business the defendant was the principal and Eish Bros. & Co. were his agents; that said loan was evidenced by the promissory note of the defendant signed “ Fish Bros. & Go.; ” that said note was renewed at maturity by a note signed in the same manner, and said indebtedness has been renewed from time to…

The case is stated in the opinion. The defendants appealed, each independently, from the judgment. They argued, among other things, that their client contracted only to carry the plaintiff to Elroy, the terminus of its line; and this duty it fully performed. In the sale of the ticket to a point beyond such terminus it acted merely as the agent of the other defendant.

The complaint shows that the defendant is a municipal corporation and that it is its duty to provide a perfect and efficient system of drainage and sewerage within its corporate limits, and to keep the same in good repair and free from obstructions, and to construct the same so skilfully that it shall not become a nuisance either to the public or to any private person, and to establish and alter the grades of streets in said city; that the plaintiff is the owner of lot 1,…

The following statement of the facts was prepared by Mr. Justice Oassoday; “ March 1Y, 1883, Napoleon B. Caswell died at his residence in… Held: retained, invested, employed, and dealt with by the said executors, in like manner as they are required to hold, invest, employ, and deal with the income of the personal estate, in the execution of their trust as executors. “ 12, By the terms of the seventh paragraph of the said will, the said daughters of the testator, Mary and…

Tbe case is tbus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday: “ This action was commenced December 13, 1880, to recover damages for personal injury happening to the plaintiff on the evening of July 7,1879, by reason of a defective sidewalk on the north side of Dewey street, in the defendant city. The complaint was in the usual form in such cases.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Oassoday: “Ejectment.' Solomon W. Newman died November 20, 1881, seized of the land in question. The plaintiff was his son by his first wife, and at the time of his father’s death was his only surviving heir at law, and as such claims to be the owner hi fee-simple absolute, and lawfully entitled to the immediate possession, of the land in question.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice-Cassoday: “ The plaintiffs and the defendant were partners. They dissolved by mutual consent.

Action to enforce a lien for purchase money upon a quantity of saw-logs. The defendant was a purchaser from the original vendee. The circuit court submitted to a jury the question whether the defendant, at the time it purchased the' logs, had notice of the lien which the action was brought to enforce. The jury'failed to agree upon that question, and was discharged.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff, by reason of the defective and unsafe condition of a public highway in the defendant town. The jury returned a special verdict, which was as follows: “ (1) Did the plaintiff, on the 20th day of July, 1881, while driving from Menomonee to his home in Spring Brook, over a road in defendant town, receive injuries to his person by being thrown from his wagon?

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for St. Croix Comity.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Croix County. The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cassoday : “The plaintiff owned a large quantity of land in the town of Emerald, in the defendant county.

Action to recover damages on account of personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff by reason of a defective sidewalk in the defendant city. The plaintiff had a judgment for $500 damages, and the defendant appeals. The facts essential to an understanding of the questions determined will sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Replevin for two horses, one harness, one sleigh, one wagon, and two cows, alleged to have been levied upon and seized by the defendant, who was the sheriff of Dane county, by virtue of a certain attachment and an execution duly issued by the circuit court of that county against the property of the plaintiff, and in the hands of such sheriff for service. The plaintiff claims that the property in controversy is exempt from seizure by virtue of such writs.

Tbe case is sufficiently stated in tbe opinion. They argued, inter alia, that it was error (3, 4) to exclude the hypothetical questions put to Dr. Garry on his cross-examination, assuming facts which the defendant claimed had been shown by plaintiff’s own testimony. Eogers on Exp. Test. secs. 28, 32; Leopold v. Van Kink, 29 Wis. 548.