¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent.
¶3On May 14 at approximately 1:80 A.M., Officer Martin was called to assist the night shift, He went to Wal-Mart Plaza in Frankfort, Clinton County, Indiana, where a burglary had taken place. He was informed that two black males had fled the scene running east from behind the plaza. Open fields extend several miles east until a highway intersects them. A populated area les west of the plaza. Officer Martin cruised the area until about 2:30 A.M. and then parked at 18th and Hot Dog Avenues. Traffic was very light with mostly truck traffic. He noticed a dark car eastbound on 28th with a black male driving. He pulled in behind the vehicle and saw that the car had Clinton County license plates. He further observed someone's head on the passenger side appearing as if someone had slid down in the seat. He did not recognize the individual in the car. The uncontradicted evidence also demonstrates there are 100 African-Americans in Clinton County with 80 of them being males. Officer Martin then contacted Officer Porter and directed him to get in front of the car with Clinton County plates. After Officer Porter was in position, the vehicle was stopped and the passenger ordered out of the car. After the two men exited the car, Officer Porter observed that the steering column had been broken and the car had been hot wired. The car occupants were placed under arrest.
¶4Our supreme court in the unanimous opinion of Poling v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1074, 1077, clearly sets out the rule on initial stops:
"A police officer may make an initial or investigatory stop of a person or automobile under cireumstances where probable cause for arrest is lacking when the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop are such as to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe an investigation is appropriate. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Taylor v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 558, 561, 406 N.E.2d 2474, 250."
¶5The court found that California police officers were within the rule when they observed two young males sitting in a car with Missouri plates in a parking lot. The area was a *226high crime area and the police could not tell whether the boys were asleep or unconscious.
¶6In Marsh v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 877, 878, our supreme court stated:
"A robbery by two white men had just occurred and the officer was near the robbers' possible destination. The hour was late and the streets empty but for the defendant's and his companion's vehicle. The officer found their behavior unusual. These facts indicate the constitutionality of the officer's action pursuant to Terry v. Oho (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889...."
¶7In Cheeks v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 190, 361 N.E.2d 906, 909, our supreme court found the following facts sufficient:
"When Deputy Sheriff Geloff stopped the automobile in which the Appellant was riding, he was in possession of at least the following information on the crimes in question: 1) Two Negro males had robbed the Kroger store on north Michigan Road; 2) Near the time of the robbery, a large blue automobile was seen driving from the Kroger parking lot at a high rate of speed; 3) This blue car headed south on Michigan Road; 4) A woman's purse was taken during the robbery; 5) The erimes occurred at approximately 12:30 a.m., when it may be presumed that traffic was not at its peak level."
¶8See also Williams v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 547, 307 N.E.2d 457 and Smith v. State (1975), 163 Ind.App. 425, 324 N.E.2d 276, where the courts have held similar facts, as in our case, well within the guidelines and the product of efficient law enforcement.
¶9After the stop, the officers, based on safety concerns, may exercise discretion and require a driver and passenger to exit the vehicle. Poling at 1077. Here the officers under the cireumstances were warranted as men of reasonable caution to believe the stop was appropriate. After observing the broken steering column, they had probable cause to arrest.
¶10I would affirm the trial court.