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← 630 SO2D 872 - State v. Wolfe

State v. Wolfe’s Empirical Analysis

1993

Citation profile

18
cited by 18 later decisions
1
states following
September 2017
most recently cited

16 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently September 2017

16 state decisions

110199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Anders v. California · Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Bagley · Giglio v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"We note that even if the defendant had requested the informant's identity prior to trial, the defendant would not have been entitled to the information. The identity of a confidential informant who supplies information concerning a crime to law enforcement officers is privileged, and such identity should only be divulged under exceptional circumstances. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); State v. Oliver, 430 So.2d 650 (La.1983), cert. den., Oliver v. Louisiana, 464 U.S. 997 , 104 S.Ct. 495 , 78 L.Ed.2d 688 (1983); State v. Clouatre, 482 So.2d 106 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). The defendant has the burden of showing exceptional circumstances, and much discretion is vested in the trial court's determination of whether the circumstances warrant disclosure. Oliver; Clouatre, supra . Earlier Louisiana cases mandated disclosure of an informant's identify when it was shown that the informant participated in the crime. In Oliver, the Court noted: `only when the evidence shows that the informant, in cooperation with the police, participated in the crime, should the identity be disclosed to the defendant. In such cases, the informant does more than furnish a tip that enables the police to make an arrest or search. While working with the police, he takes part in the illegal transaction itself.' (at 652). Later cases from this court have adopted the three-prong test of criteria employed by the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for determining whe”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Ladies and gentlemen, a person accused of a crime is presumed by our law to be innocent until each element of the crime necessary to constitute his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the duty of the jury, in considering the evidence and in applying to that evidence the law as given by the court, to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising out of the evidence or out of the lack of evidence in the case. It is the duty of the jury if not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt to find him not guilty. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence, but may rest upon the presumption of innocence until it is overthrown by positive, affirmative proof presented by the State. The burden, therefore, is upon the State to establish to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant as to the crime charged. If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the guilt of the defendant, it is your sworn duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. This doubt must be a reasonable one. That is, one founded upon a real, tangible and substantial basis and not upon a mere caprice, fancy or conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty raised in your mind by reason of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence. Likewise, if the State has proved the guilt of the defendant to your satisfaction and beyo”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Reasonable doubt is doubt that must be based on reason and it must be substantial rather than speculative. It must be sufficient enough to cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in important affairs of a person's lief [sic, life]. This doubt must be a reasonable one, one founded on a real tangible basis and not upon a mere conjecture. Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, it is an actual doubt. It is a serious doubt for which you could give a good reason. There would be a reasonable doubt if after all the evidence is compared and considered by you, and in your mind you do not have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the guilt of the defendant or defendants. A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense. I charge you that a defendant is never to be convicted upon mere suspicion, conjecture, or probability of guilt. If you entertain any reasonable doubt as to any element necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt it is your sworn duty to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and acquit him. On the other hand, if you find from the testimony and evidence that the State has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt then you are to return a verdict of guilty. [Emphasis added.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.