Block v. Potter’s Empirical Analysis
631 F.2d 233 · 1980
Citation profile
20 federal appellate · 6 district · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently September 2021 · most notably Coady v. Vaughn (2001), Baumann v. Arizona Department of Corrections (1985)
20 federal appellate · 6 district · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Morrissey v. Brewer · Wolff v. McDonnell · Perry v. Sindermann · Beck v. State of Ohio
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[e]ven if a state statute does not give rise to a liberty interest in parole release under Greenholtz , once a state institutes a parole system all prisoners have a liberty interest flowing directly from the due process clause in not being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible rea sons. Consequently, in alleging that the [Board of Parole] acted arbitrarily by basing its decision on impermissible grounds, we believe that [the plaintiff] has stated a valid due process claim that this Court must resolve.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“In Greenholtz [v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979),] the [U.S. Supreme Court] held that there is no liberty interest in parole release ... to which procedural due process protections attach. This holding, however, does not stand for the proposition that once a state decides to provide that which it is not constitutionally compelled to offer, there are no constitutional limitations whatsoever on the basis for making decisions under the program. To interpret Green-holtz as so holding would be to ascribe to that opinion the intent to initiate a major upheaval in due process jurisprudence. The case, however, does not contravene the time-honored principle that “the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government". ... [Although “nothing in the Constitution requires a State to provide for probation or parole ... when a State adopts a parole system that applies general standards of eligibility, prisoners justifiably expect that parole will be granted fairly and according to law whenever those standards are met. The presence of a large measure of discretion in a parole system ... does not alter the fundamental due process limitation against capricious decisionmaking. A legislative grant of discretion does not amount to a license for arbitrary behavior. .... [A] state statute may not sanction totally arbitrary parole decisions founded on impermissible criteria. Under th”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“race, religion, political beliefs, or frivolous criteria with no rational relationship to the purpose of parole such as the color of one's eyes, the school one attended, or the style of one's clothing.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.