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← 632 P2D 644 - Doty v. Chalk

Doty v. Chalk’s Empirical Analysis

1981

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
2
states following
March 2010
most recently cited

2 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently March 2010

2 district · 4 state decisions

401981199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Anderson v. Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc. · Lively v. Wick · McCain v. Cook · Fritts v. Ericson · Buena Vista Bank & Trust Co. v. Lee

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Wle do not agree with defendants' contention that the disclaimer signed by Mrs. Thomas [the first predecessor] prior to her execution of the quitclaim deed to plaintiff divested her of title to the property. Title to property acquired by adverse possession matures into an absolute fee interest after the statutory prescriptive period has expired. Section 38-41-101, C.R.S. 1978; Spring Valley Estates, Inc. v. Cunninghaom, [ 181 Colo. 435 , 510 P.2d 336 (1978)]. Transfer of the property may only be effected by a validly executed deed, by adverse possession, or by other legal means. McCain v. Cook, 184 Neb. 147 , 165 N.W.2d 734 (1969). Here, no claim is made on appeal that the disclaimer was, in effect, a quitclaim deed. And, there are no words of conveyance in the disclaimer that would make it a deed. See § 88-80-113 and § 38-80-116, C.R.S.1978. Moreover, such title cannot be divested by a cessation of occupancy or by the acknowledgment of title in the former owner. Crawford v. French, [ 633 P.2d 524 (Colo.App.1981)]; McCain v. Cook, supra; see also Fritts v. Ericson, 103 Ariz. 33 , 436 P.2d 582 (1968). Hence, since title to the disputed property vested in Mrs. Thomas long before the disclaimer was executed here, such disclaimer had no legal effect. See Crawford v. French, supro; McCain v. Cook, supra.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Title to property acquired by adverse possession matures into an absolute fee interest after the statutory prescriptive period has expired.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.