State v. Allen

¶1(dissenting).

¶2I respectfully dissent.

¶3I believe our court, in State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1977), correctly interpreted our statute defining “delivery” of a controlled substance. The case should not be overruled. In 1977, when Lottwas decided, “delivery” was defined by the legislature as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance.” See Iowa Code § 204.101(8) (1977). The same wording is still used to define “delivery.” See id.§ 124.101(7) (1999).

¶4In Lott, we said the principal whose crime is defined is a person who participates in the delivery of a controlled substance. A customer is not guilty of delivery because by definition the recipient is not the deliverer. “Moreover, because the deliverer is not the transferee, one who aids only the transferee cannot be guilty of delivery.” Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 107.

¶5The legislature has not changed this statute since our interpretation of it in 1977. It is irrelevant that other state courts in viewing their statutory scheme have reached other interpretations. The meaning of Iowa’s statutory definition of “delivery” is crystal clear, as shown by our holding in Lott.

¶6I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.