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634 So. 2d 589

Watson v. Watson

Carol A. WATSON v. Joe Bob WATSON.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

Decided January 28, 1994

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Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama · decided 1994-01-28

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Visitation cases require an examination of the facts and circumstances of the individual situation which the trial court is able to observe.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 887 So. 2d 257 - Smith v. Smith

“we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; and, absent abuse, there is no basis for reversal.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hoag v. Stinson

Relies on Ex Parte Couch · Andrews v. Andrews · 494 So. 2d 95 - Santmier v. Santmier

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1994-01-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently August 2018

14 state decisions

80199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

AV92000433.

¶1Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

January 28, 1994.

¶2Donald C. McCabe of Donald C. McCabe, P.C., Daleville, for appellant.

¶3James F. Hampton, Montgomery, for appellee.

¶4THIGPEN, Judge.

¶5This is the appeal of a custody and visitation determination.

¶6The record reveals that the parties divorced in August 1985 and that they were awarded joint custody of their two minor children pursuant to an agreement incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. In June 1992, the mother filed a petition for modification of the joint custody order seeking, inter alia, custody and child support. The father answered and filed a counter-petition seeking, inter alia, custody and child support.

¶7Following an ore tenus proceeding the father was awarded custody subject to the *590 mother's visitation and the mother was ordered to pay child support. The mother appeals raising several issues; however, the dispositive issues are whether the trial court abused its discretion in its custody determination, and whether the trial court abused its discretion in its visitation determination.

¶8It is well settled that matters regarding custody rest soundly within the discretion of the trial court, and judgments regarding such will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Santmier v. Santmier, 494 So.2d 95 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986). The paramount concern in all custody cases is the best interests and welfare of the children. Santmier, supra. In the instant case, the trial court correctly noted that in view of the parties' prior exercise of joint custody, this is an initial custody determination and the applicable standard is the "best interests of the children." Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988); Hovater v. Hovater, 577 So.2d 461 (Ala.Civ.App.1990); Santmier, supra.

¶9In making its custody determination, the mother argues that the trial court did not find her unfit, that it did not order the testimony of the minor children, and that it modified the custody order solely due to problems regarding visitation and child support. The appropriate standard, i.e., best interests, does not require a finding of unfitness. There are situations where a trial court faces a custody determination wherein more than one party is a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. See ergo, Hermsmeier v. McCoy, 591 So.2d 508 (Ala.Civ.App.1991); H.T. and G.T. v. C.T.W. and R.J.W., 569 So.2d 418 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990). Further, visitation problems alone are an insufficient basis for changing custody orders. Means v. Means, 512 So.2d 1386 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Ward v. Rodenbaugh, 509 So.2d 910 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). There is nothing in the record indicating that visitation problems caused the custody change. Additionally, the record contains generous evidence which does not concern visitation that clearly supports the trial court's order regarding custody. The mother's argument regarding the testimony of the children is not properly presented or argued and will not be addressed. Rule 28(a)(5), A.R.App.P.; Simonton v. Carroll, 512 So.2d 1384 (Ala.Civ. App.1987).

¶10Detailing specific facts in this case would serve no purpose in light of the vast number of cases concerning child custody. We have carefully and thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety and find ample evidence supporting the trial court's custody determination. The record contains evidence which would support an award of custody to either parent; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶11The mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the visitation order. The matter of visitation rests soundly within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's determination regarding visitation must be affirmed absent a finding that the judgment is unsupported by any credible evidence and that the judgment, therefore, is plainly and palpably wrong. Andrews v. Andrews, 520 So.2d 512 (Ala.Civ. App.1987). Visitation cases require an examination of the facts and circumstances of the individual situation which the trial court is able to observe. Andrews, supra. Inherent in the presumption that a judgment based on ore tenus evidence is correct is the recognition that the trial court is uniquely qualified to observe the parties and adjudge their credibility. Hall v. Hall, 571 So.2d 1176 (Ala.Civ.App.1990).

¶12In the instant case, it appears that the trial court considered the evidence regarding the circumstances in this situation before making its determination. Although we may have determined a different or more lenient schedule for the mother's visitation, we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; and, absent abuse, there is no basis for reversal. Andrews, supra.

¶13Based on the foregoing principles, we must affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶14AFFIRMED.

¶15ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs.

¶16YATES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

¶17*591 YATES, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶18I concur with the majority in affirming the trial court's award of custody to the father. I respectfully dissent, however, on the issue of visitation.

¶19The trial court awarded the mother visitation with the minor children during spring vacation each year; from July 1 to August 15 each year; at Thanksgiving during odd-numbered years; and approximately one week at Christmas each year. The order did not include any weekend visitation or any provision for birthdays, Mother's day, or other special occasions. Consequently, the mother now faces periods extending from March to July (approximately three months) without seeing her children. She faces an even longer period without visitation during even-numbered years (August 15 until Christmas, over four months).

¶20The distance between Wetumpka, Alabama, and Enterprise, Alabama, is not such that some visitation for weekends and special occasions would be burdensome on either the parties or the children.

¶21Nothing in the record indicated that more generous visitation would be contrary to the best interests of the minor children. Instead, the record reflected that before these proceedings, the parties had shared a joint-custody arrangement with shared visitation. The mother should be allowed to maintain a close relationship with her children. The limited visitation awarded by the trial court makes such a relationship extremely difficult at best, and in my opinion, was an abuse of discretion.

¶22

¶23This is the appeal of a custody and visitation determination.

¶24The record reveals that the parties divorced in August 1985 and that they were awarded joint custody of their two minor children pursuant to an agreement incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. In June 1992, the mother filed a petition for modification of the joint custody order seeking, inter alia, custody and child support. The father answered and filed a counter-petition seeking, inter alia, custody and child support.

¶25Following an ore tenus proceeding the father was awarded custody subject to the *590 mother's visitation and the mother was ordered to pay child support. The mother appeals raising several issues; however, the dispositive issues are whether the trial court abused its discretion in its custody determination, and whether the trial court abused its discretion in its visitation determination.

¶26It is well settled that matters regarding custody rest soundly within the discretion of the trial court, and judgments regarding such will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Santmier v. Santmier, 494 So.2d 95 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986). The paramount concern in all custody cases is the best interests and welfare of the children. Santmier, supra. In the instant case, the trial court correctly noted that in view of the parties' prior exercise of joint custody, this is an initial custody determination and the applicable standard is the "best interests of the children." Ex parte Couch,521 So.2d 987 (Ala. 1988); Hovater v. Hovater, 577 So.2d 461 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990); Santmier, supra.

¶27In making its custody determination, the mother argues that the trial court did not find her unfit, that it did not order the testimony of the minor children, and that it modified the custody order solely due to problems regarding visitation and child support. The appropriate standard, i.e., best interests, does not require a finding of unfitness. There are situations where a trial court faces a custody determination wherein more than one party is a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. See ergo, Hermsmeier v. McCoy, 591 So.2d 508 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991); H.T. and G.T. v. C.T.W. and R.J.W.,569 So.2d 418 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990). Further, visitation problems alone are an insufficient basis for changing custody orders. Means v.Means, 512 So.2d 1386 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987); Ward v.Rodenbaugh, 509 So.2d 910 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987). There is nothing in the record indicating that visitation problems caused the custody change. Additionally, the record contains generous evidence which does not concern visitation that clearly supports the trial court's order regarding custody. The mother's argument regarding the testimony of the children is not properly presented or argued and will not be addressed. Rule 28(a)(5), A.R.App.P.; Simonton v. Carroll, 512 So.2d 1384 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987).

¶28Detailing specific facts in this case would serve no purpose in light of the vast number of cases concerning child custody. We have carefully and thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety and find ample evidence supporting the trial court's custody determination. The record contains evidence which would support an award of custody to either parent; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶29The mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the visitation order. The matter of visitation rests soundly within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's determination regarding visitation must be affirmed absent a finding that the judgment is unsupported by any credible evidence and that the judgment, therefore, is plainly and palpably wrong. Andrews v. Andrews, 520 So.2d 512 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987). Visitation cases require an examination of the facts and circumstances of the individual situation which the trial court is able to observe. Andrews, supra. Inherent in the presumption that a judgment based on ore tenus evidence is correct is the recognition that the trial court is uniquely qualified to observe the parties and adjudge their credibility. Hall v. Hall, 571 So.2d 1176 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990).

¶30In the instant case, it appears that the trial court considered the evidence regarding the circumstances in this situation before making its determination. Although we may have determined a different or more lenient schedule for the mother's visitation, we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; and, absent abuse, there is no basis for reversal. Andrews, supra.

¶31Based on the foregoing principles, we must affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶32AFFIRMED.

¶33ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs.

¶34YATES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. *591

¶35

¶36I concur with the majority in affirming the trial court's award of custody to the father. I respectfully dissent, however, on the issue of visitation.

¶37The trial court awarded the mother visitation with the minor children during spring vacation each year; from July 1 to August 15 each year; at Thanksgiving during odd-numbered years; and approximately one week at Christmas each year. The order did not include any weekend visitation or any provision for birthdays, Mother's day, or other special occasions. Consequently, the mother now faces periods extending from March to July (approximately three months) without seeing her children. She faces an even longer period without visitation during even-numbered years (August 15 until Christmas, over four months).

¶38The distance between Wetumpka, Alabama, and Enterprise, Alabama, is not such that some visitation for weekends and special occasions would be burdensome on either the parties or the children.

¶39Nothing in the record indicated that more generous visitation would be contrary to the best interests of the minor children. Instead, the record reflected that before these proceedings, the parties had shared a joint-custody arrangement with shared visitation. The mother should be allowed to maintain a close relationship with her children. The limited visitation awarded by the trial court makes such a relationship extremely difficult at best, and in my opinion, was an abuse of discretion.

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