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← 635 F.2d 330 - Keyes v. Lauga

Keyes v. Lauga’s Empirical Analysis

635 F.2d 330 · 1981

Citation profile

108
cited by 108 later decisions
4
states following
December 2010
most recently cited

86 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 108 later decisions — most recently December 2010 · most notably Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad (1982), Thompkins v. Belt (1987)

86 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

7601981199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Relies on Younger v. Harris · Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States · Carey v. Piphus · Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. · Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 108 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “If the defendants knew or should have known that the witnesses were necessary, then the exclusion of those witnesses was not manifestly unjust. In fact, the admission of the two witnesses may well have resulted in manifest injustice to the plaintiffs, for they would not have had time to prepare their own response to those witnesses’ testimony. In these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the defendants to ambush [the plaintiffs] ... by introducing two surprise witnesses whose credibility could not have been attacked by the plaintiffs. 6”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. should not be decided by which side has the better of the case, nor should they be granted only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict. There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “having had the opportunity to observe the trial, is in a better position than [the appellate court] to evaluate the subjective elements of damage suffered by [the plaintiff]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.