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← 635 FSUPP2D 564 - Murkeldove v. Astrue

Murkeldove v. Astrue’s Empirical Analysis

2009

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
May 2012
most recently cited

1 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 7430 · 28 U.S.C. § 2112 · 28 U.S.C. § 2412 · 31 U.S.C. § 3727 · 42 U.S.C. § 405 (§ 205 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 406 (§ 206 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 4654

Relies on United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. · Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. · Lane v. Pena Secretary of Transportation · Shalala v. Schaefer · Barnhart Commissioner of Social Security v. Walton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The EAJA renders the United States liable for attorney’s fees for which it would not otherwise be liable, and thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity.” Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 137 , 112 S.Ct. 515 , 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991). “A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text ... and will not be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 , 116 S.Ct. 2092 , 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996). “Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States.” Ardestani 502 U.S. at 137 , 112 S.Ct. 515 ; see also Texas Food Indus. Ass’n v. USDA, 81 F.3d 578 , 580 (5th Cir.1996) (“Because EAJA is a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, it must be strictly construed in the government’s favor.”). “[T]he terms of its waiver, as set forth expressly and specifically by Congress, define the parameters of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction... Ware v. United States, 626 F.2d 1278, 1286 (5th Cir.1980). Nothing could be clearer from the wording of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) than that the statute authorizes an award only to “a prevailing party” for fees “incurred by that party” in a civil action. Also apparent is the inference that the statute is not for the benefit of the lawyer for the prevailing party and does not contemplate an award of lawyer’s fees to a lawyer whose client has not incurred those fees. Put another way, the wording of the statute makes clear that its purpose is to make provision for com”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment ....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.