Williams v. Beard’s Empirical Analysis
637 F.3d 195 · 2011
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 1 district · 9 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Miller-El v. Cockrell Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · In the Matter of Samuel Winship
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A careful prejudice inquiry requires that we ‘consider all the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it if [counsel] had pursued [a] different path.’ Wong [v. Belmontes ], [558] U.S. 15, 130 S.Ct. [383] at 386 [ (2009) ]. This includes evidence that was adduced at trial as well as that which was not presented until postconviction review. See Porter [v. McCollum ], 558 U.S. 30 , 130 S.Ct. [447] at 454 [(2009)]. Stated differently, we must reconstruct the record and assess it anew. In so doing, we cannot merely consider the mitigation evidence that went unmentioned in the first instance; we must also take account of the anti-mitigation evidence that the Commonwealth would have presented to rebut the petitioner’s mitigation testimony. See Wong, 558 U.S. 15 , 130 S.Ct. at 390 (stating that ‘the reviewing court must consider all the evidence — the good and the bad — when evaluating prejudice’). Once we have reconstructed the record, we must ‘reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigation evidence.’ Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Only then may we ask whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result of the proceeding would have been different,””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[I]f you find that John Calvaresi actually had the specific intent, and actually killed Stanley Detweiler, with specific intent, so that John Calvaresi’s crime was first degree murder, then, the only way that Michael Boettlin can also be found guilty of first degree murder is if Michael Boettlin [was] an accomplice .... ... You may find the Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, if you are satisfied that each of the following 3 elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that Stanley Detweiler is dead, second, that an accomplice of the Defendant killed him, and third, that the killing was with specific intent to kill and with malice. ... [Y]ou cannot find the Defendant guilty of first degree murder unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he and/or his accomplice had a specific intent to kill.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.