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637 So. 2d 1032

Docket No. 93-KK-2734.

State v. Joseph

STATE of Louisiana v. Wilfred JOSEPH.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Decided June 3, 1994.

Supreme Court of Louisiana · decided 1994-06-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The state has a heavy burden of justifying an apparently untimely commencement of trial on grounds that the time limits in Art. 578 were either interrupted or suspended, (citations omitted) Un-particularized allegations of a crowded docket [such as caused the delays herein] do not satisfy that burden. Administrative problems within the court system [as occurred in this case resulting in delays] generally do not constitute causes of interruption beyond the control of the state because ‘the court system cannot excuse itself from affording an accused a trial within the delay required by law, simply by relying upon internal operating procedures which result in noncompliance with the statutory mandate, (citation omitted).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 127 So. 3d 1015 - State v. Duraso

“The state has a heavy burden of justifying an apparently untimely commencement of trial on grounds that the time limits in Art. 578 were either interrupted or suspended. State v. Rome, 630 So.2d 1284 (La.1994); State v. Nations, 420 So.2d 967 (La. 1982)..... The trial court therefore erred in denying the motion to quash. We have never required a showing of specific prejudice once the defendant has demonstrated that the prosecution has exceeded the limits imposed by Art. 578, and the state has failed to carry its burden of justifying the delay. [Cites omitted].”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 701 So. 2d 706 - State v. Forrest

Relies on 630 So. 2d 1284 - State v. Rome · 347 So. 2d 1132 - State v. Driever · 391 So. 2d 813 - State v. Devito

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1994-06-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently September 2018

24 state decisions

90199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Gregory A. Miller, Norco, for applicant.

¶2Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., New Orleans, Harry J. Morel, Jr., Dist. Atty., Hahnville, Emile R. St. Pierre, Destrehan, for respondent.

¶3PER CURIAM:

¶4The defendant was charged by grand jury indictment returned on April 11, 1991, with distribution of cocaine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967. On June 15, 1993, with trial set for the following week after numerous delays, the defendant filed a motion to quash on grounds that the two-year time limit for the prosecution set by La.Cr.P. art. 578(2), had expired. The trial court conducted a hearing on June 21, 1993, and denied the motion on grounds that a heavy trial docket, which on two occasions had "bumped" the defendant's case for trial of another case set on the same day, constituted a "cause beyond control of the state" for purposes of interrupting prescription under La.C.Cr.P. art. 579A(2). The defendant sought review in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, which denied relief for the same reasons given by the trial court, and upon finding that the defendant's case "ha[d] not been prejudiced by the delay."

¶5The courts below erred. The state has a heavy burden of justifying an apparently untimely commencement of trial on grounds that the time limits in Art. 578 were either interrupted or suspended. State v. Rome, 630 So.2d 1284 (La.1994); State v. Nations, 420 So.2d 967 (La.1982). Unparticularized allegations of a crowded docket do not satisfy that burden. Administrative problems within the court system generally do not constitute causes of interruption beyond control of the state because "[t]he court system cannot excuse itself from affording *1033 an accused a trial within the delay required by law, simply by relying upon internal operating procedures which result in noncompliance with the statutory mandate." State v. Driever, 347 So.2d 1132, 1134 (La. 1977).

¶6The trial court therefore erred in denying the motion to quash. We have never required a showing of specific prejudice once the defendant has demonstrated that the prosecution has exceeded the limits imposed by Art. 578, and the state has failed to carry its burden of justifying the delay. State v. Rome, supra; State v. DeVito, 391 So.2d 813 (La.1980) (on rehearing); State v. Driever, supra. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and order the proceedings against the defendant quashed.

¶7JUDGMENT REVERSED; MOTION TO QUASH GRANTED.

¶8HALL, J., not on panel.

¶9SHORTESS, Judge, First Circuit Court of Appeal, sitting in place of DENNIS, J.

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