State v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis
1994
Citation profile
12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently May 2013
12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · 433 So. 2d 688 - State v. Smith · 523 So. 2d 1305 - State v. Mussall · 448 So. 2d 645 - State v. Davis · State v. Thomas
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A. Illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities is the intentional or criminally negligent discharging of any firearm, or the throwing, placing, or other use of any article, liquid, or substance, where it is foreseeable that it may result in death or great bodily harm to a human being. * * * F. Whoever commits the crime of illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities by discharging a firearm while committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to commit a crime of violence . . . , shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less then ten years nor more than twenty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. . . .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“LSA-R.S. 14:94 clearly prohibits the discharging of a firearm in either an intentional or criminally negligent manner where death or great bodily harm to a human being is foreseeable. The confusion mentioned by the trial court, and now asserted by Walker, concerns the lesser included offense of attempt. (See previous discussion of the jury verdict form.) That factor, however, does not prevent a person of reasonable intelligence from ascertaining that firing a gun in the direction of an occupied automobile constitutes a criminal act. Nor, when the enhanced penalty provisions of Subsection F are implicated, does the definition of the crime become less understandable. Instead, one element is merely added: the defendant must be committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, as defined in LSA-R.S. 14:2(13). Although aggravated assault, the crime of violence alleged here, is arguably less serious than the felonies also listed in Paragraph 13, it constitutes a criminal act nonetheless. Accordingly, we find no merit in Walker's contention of unconstitutional vagueness.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.