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← 638 F.2d 507 - United States v. Vasquez

United States v. Vasquez’s Empirical Analysis

638 F.2d 507 · 1980

Citation profile

227
cited by 227 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
11
states following
April 2018
most recently cited

133 federal appellate · 17 district · 16 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 227 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2018 · most notably Vasquez v. United States (1981), United States v. Martino (1981)

133 federal appellate · 17 district · 16 state decisions — followed in 11 states

13001980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Glasser v. United States · Wong Sun v. United States · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Chimel v. California

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 227 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “if the arresting officers had “(1) a reasonable belief that third persons [were] inside, and (2) a reasonable belief that the third persons [were] aware of the arrest outside the premises so that they might destroy evidence, escape or jeopardize the safety of the officers or the public.””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[I]f the individual has merely acquiesced in a show of authority, he should not be found to have consented.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Law enforcement officers may of course briefly stop a person without arresting him; to the extent, however, that the stop has the effect of restraining the individual’s freedom to walk away, the Fourth Amendment requires that the stop be reasonable. E. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 16 [ 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ] . . . (1968); see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 50 [ 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 ] . . . (1979). Whether or not this standard of reasonableness is met depends principally on two factors; the basis for the stop and the degree to which the stop restrains the individual. As to the first element, a detention does not comply with the Fourth Amendment unless the officers were ‘aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that the individual was engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponse, 422 U.S. 873 , 874 [ 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 2577, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ] . . . (1975)____ The second factor in evaluating the reasonableness of a detention is the degree of intrusion into the individual’s freedom. The greater the intrusion, the stronger the basis for the officers’ action must be. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), for example, the police took a suspect from his home to the police station and kept him there for questioning. While the suspect was not technically under arrest, neither was he free to leave. The court held this ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.