Lancaster v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

81 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “which, if true, entitle[s] the petitioner to relief.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Coughlin v. State · Woodruff v. City of Pelham

2. “"The circuit court dismissed the remainder of Mr. Morris's claims in his postconviction petition pursuant to Rules 32.2(a)(2), (3), or (4) because those claims were raised at trial, could have been raised at trial, or were raised on direct appeal: "II. Mr. Morris's Claim that He Cannot Be Put to Death Because a Previous Jury Was Unable to Convict Him; "V. Mr. Morris's Claim that the Trial Court Improperly Refused to Allow Inquiry into an Alternative Theory of the Crime; "VII. Mr. Morris's Claim that the DNA Evidence in the Trial Was Improperly Collected, Tested, and Admitted; "IX. Mr. Morris's Claim that His Right to a Speedy Trial Was Violated by the Six-Year Delay Between His Arrest and Trial; "X. Mr. Morris's Claim that the Counting of Robbery as Both an Element of the Offense and an Aggravating Circumstance Violates His Right to an Individualized Sentence; "XI. Mr. Morris's Claim that the Trial Court Improperly Excluded Two Jurors for Cause, Denying Mr. Morris of His Right to an Impartial Trial; "XII. Mr. Morris's Claim that Eyewitness Testimony Based on a One-Man Showup Violated His Rights Under the U.S. Constitution and Alabama Law; "XIII. Mr. Morris's Claim that Alabama's System of Judicial Sentencing in Capital Cases Violates the U.S. Constitution. "The circuit court dismissed the following claim in Mr. Morris's postconviction petition pursuant to Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (5) because this claim could have been, but was not, raised at trial, and could have been, but was no”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Morris v. State

3. “"A defendant undoubtedly has the constitutional right to be present and attended by counsel at sentencing, Mempa v. Rhay , 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967), and to have counsel appointed on appeal, Douglas v. California , 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S.Ct. 814 , 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), as well as the statutory right to speak on his own behalf before; sentence is pronounced, Rule 26.9(b)(1), [Ala].R.Crim.P., and to be informed of his right to appeal, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-22-130 ; Rule 26.9(b)(4). "While all of the foregoing rights are fundamental, all of them can be waived. See Rule 26.7 (waiver of the defendant's presence at sentencing, which necessarily subsumes waiver of allocution and notice of right to appeal); Rule 6.1(b) (waiver of right to counsel). If a right can be waived, it is not a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. `[A] defendant can not be deemed to have waived an objection that the trial court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter.' City of Dothan v. Holloway , 501 So.2d 1136 , 1139 (Ala. 1986). ". . . . " Neal v. State , 257 Ala. 496 , 59 So.2d 797 , 798 (1952), does . . . state that `the continuous presence of the defendant from arraignment to sentence is an essential part of the process provided for the trial of the defendant and without which the court has no jurisdiction to pronounce judgment against him.' In view of the Alabama Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the nonwaivability of subject matter jurisdiction, the langua”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ex Parte Robey