Alter v. Michael’s Empirical Analysis
1966
Citation profile
60 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 63 later decisions — most recently July 2003 · most notably 6 Cal. 3d 176 - Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971), 6 Cal. 3d 195 - Budd v. Nixen (1971)
60 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 54 Cal. 2d 603 - Kusior v. Silver · 45 Cal. 2d 345 - Cole v. Rush · 6 Cal. 2d 302 - Huysman v. Kirsch · 42 Cal. 2d 767 - Stafford v. Shultz · Weinstock v. Eissler
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Arguments that discrimination results in favor of doctors and against lawyers should be addressed to the Legislature and not to the courts. We note, however, the rule that the one-year period applicable to a medical malpractice action does not commence to run until the patient discovers his injury or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered it [citing cases], whereas the two-year period which governs a legal malpractice action runs from the time of the negligent acts. (Bustamante v. Haet (1963) supra, 222 Cal. App. 2d 413, 414-415 , 35 Cal. Rptr. 176 , and cases there cited.) In this respect the rules could be viewed as discriminating in favor of lawyers. (See Griffith v. Zavlaris (1963) supra, 215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 830-831 , 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 , commenting that any seeming harshness in this respect as between medical and legal malpractice actions is for the Legislature to change, not the courts.) That the Legislature is aware of the differing rules as to when limitations statutes commence to run is demonstrated by the 1961 amendment which added subdivision 3 to section 339 (to cover actions based upon rescission of oral contract) and expressly declared that under certain circumstances the time begins to run from ‘the date upon which the facts * * * occurred,’ and under other circumstances it ‘does not begin to run until the discovery * * * of the facts * *.’ ” ( 413 P.2d at 155-56 , emphasis added.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“`Statutes are to be interpreted by assuming that the Legislature was aware of the existing judicial decisions. [Citation.] Moreover, failure to make changes in a given statute in a particular respect when the subject is before the Legislature, and changes are made in other respects, is indicative of an intention to leave the law unchanged in that respect.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“the Legislature is aware of the decisions declaring that the two-year limitation period of section 339, subdivision 1, governs legal malpractice actions, and has demonstrated an intention to leave that rule unchanged.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.