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64 Cal. 2d 513

People v. McCarthy

California Supreme Court

Decided May 2, 1966

California Supreme Court · decided 1966-05-02

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““. . . the statutory differentiation of the various crimes as well as the history of the cases culminating in Sullivan show that in penalizing a person who possesses a narcotic the Legislature proscribed possession of a substance that has a narcotic potential; it condemned the commodity that could be used as such. It did not refer to useless traces or residue of such substance. . . . Since in the present ease the prosecution proved no more than defendant’s possession of traces of narcotics and did not show that such residue was usable for sale or consumption, we remit it to the trial court for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not such factual elements were present. ” (Italics in original.)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including People v. Villalobos

Relies on 62 Cal. 2d 338 - People v. Dorado · 64 Cal. 2d 504 - People v. Leal

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1966-05-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently August 1991 · most notably 5 Cal. App. 3d 844 - People v. Johnson (1970), 187 Cal. App. 3d 400 - People v. Spann (1986)

39 state decisions

2601966197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

TOBRINER, J.

¶1Defendant appeals from a judgment rendered by the court without a jury convicting him of the possession of narcotics in violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code. The prosecution established defendant’s four prior felony convictions, including one narcotics violation.

¶2This case raises the same issue as that posed in People v. Leal, Crim. 9380, ante, p. 504 [50 Cal.Rptr. 777, 413 P.2d 665] decided this day, and is controlled by our decision in that case.

¶3On August 22, 1962, officers of the San Diego police called at defendant’s home to arrest him on suspicion of grand theft. Upon their arrival at defendant’s house, they *514knocked at the front door; a young girl, who was engaged as a babysitter at the house, opened the door. The officers identified themselves and asked to see defendant. The girl stated that defendant was in the house and, according to the testimony of one of the officers, opened the screen door for them.

¶4After the officers had entered, the girl proceeded down the hallway to a rear room, knocked on the door and announced that the officers wanted to speak to defendant. After an interval, the officers likewise knocked on the door and called for defendant. The door opened, and a woman emerged, attired in a bathrobe. She walked past the officers and continued up the hallway. One of the officers peered into the room and, observing defendant inside, placed him under arrest. The officers then conducted a search of the room in the course of which they discovered a narcotics injection outfit. Included in the outfit were two pieces of cotton, one of them wet. In response to questions from the police, defendant acknowledged ownership of the pieces of cotton. A forensic chemist later determined that the pieces bore traces of morphine residue.1 The present conviction rests upon defendant’s possession of these traces.

¶5After defendant had been taken to jail, he was examined by a police physician who later testified that he had discovered a number of needle marks upon defendant’s arms. The physician estimated that the marks were ‘ ‘ from less than a day old to about two weeks old.” He also testified that he had asked defendant whether he used narcotics and that defendant had replied that he had used heroin intravenously in 1955. The defendant also acknowledged to the physician that the marks upon his arms were made by a needle. The record does not indicate that defendant had been advised of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent at the time he spoke to the physician.

¶6Defendant’s conviction rested upon his possession of the minute chemical traces which the forensic chemist recovered from the pieces of cotton. In People v. Leal, supra, ante, p. 504, we held that if the prosecution proves no more than defendant’s possession of traces of narcotics and fails to show that such residues were usable for consumption or sale, the case must he remitted to the trial court for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the additional factual elements were present. The Lealdecision is controlling here.

¶7In view of our disposition of this case, we need not reach *515defendant’s alternative contentions that the introduction of the testimony relating to his statements to the officers and the physician requires reversal under People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], and that the evidence introduced against him was obtained in the course of an illegal search and seizure.

¶8The judgment is reversed.

Traynor, C. J., Peters, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., concurred.

¶9 The record does not disclose the total quantity of narcotic present, but the chemist testified that one of the pieces yielded .96 milligrams of residue.

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