64 Md. App. 359 - Smith v. Gehring’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
27 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably 127 Md. App. 172 - Nam v. Montgomery County (1999), 92 Md. App. 248 - Mattingly v. Mattingly (1992)
27 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on County of Oneida New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State New York · New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. Kinney · New York Cent Co v. Kinney · Doughty v. Prettyman · Gruca v. United States Steel Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In each of these cases, the correct defendant — the one actually intended to be sued — was served with process before limitations had run. This fact, however, is not critical. The critical factors are (1) who, on the facts of the case, was the appropriate defendant, and (2) whether that party had notice of his, or her, or its, intended status as defendant within the limitations period. In each of the three cases we have discussed, the significance of service of process was that by that means notice to the intended defendant was made apparent. In McSwain [v. Tri-State Transportation Co. Inc., 301 Md. 363 , 483 A.2d 43 (1984),] the Court of Appeals relied not only on service of process, but also on pre-suit notice to the intended defendant, Transportation. That service of process on the intended defendant is not essential to stop the running of limitations appears from our decision in Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md.App. 231 , 488 A.2d 1016 (1985).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“We hold that neither Md.Rule 2-301, nor Md.Rule 2-323(g), nor any combination of them makes the doctrine of latches available as a defense to a purely legal claim---- Those purposes do not extend ... to a legal claim as opposed to an equitable claim. The “merger” of law and equity was not intended to abolish all differences between legal and equitable claims and defenses to them, but only to abolish “[p]leading distinctions between law and equity” and “to assure that [a]ll claims and defenses are determined in one court.” [citation omitted]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“‘... when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of the opinion that a liberal rule should be applied.’”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.