64 So. 3d 93 - Serrano v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a case based wholly upon circumstantial evidence if the [S]tate fails to present evidence from which the jury could exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. However, [t]he [Sjtate is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events. Once the State meets this threshold burden, it becomes the jury’s duty to determine whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence ..., and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, [the Court] will not reverse.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 141 So. 3d 513 - Carl Dausch v. State of Florida

2. ““[I]t is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt — that is the trial court’s job.” Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997). Rather, “[i]n reviewing an aggravating factor challenged on appeal, this Court’s task ‘is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding.’ ” Hernandez v. State, 4 So.3d 642, 667 (Fla.2009) (quoting Douglas v. State, 878 So.2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla.2004)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 88 So. 3d 113 - Heyne v. State

3. “the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a “forcible abduction.” ... They rest on the sound basis that due-process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. & SC14-887 Neil K. Salazar v. State of Florida and Neil K. Salazar v. Julie L. Jones, etc.