Volume 64 — Washington Reports, Second Series

<bold>[1] Landlord and Tenant — Unlawful Detainer — Jurisdiction.</bold> Unlawful detainer actions are special statutory proceedings with the limited purpose of hastening recovery of possession of real property, and the superior court's jurisdiction in such an action is limited to the primary issue of right to possession together with the incidental issues of restitution and rent or damages. <bold>[2] Same — Unlawful Detainer — Jurisdiction.</bold> A superior court obtains jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer action from the service of the statutory summons, not from service of any of the statutory notices. <bold>[3] Same — Unlawful Detainer — Possessory Interest — Necessity.</bold> Where a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action loses his possessory interest in the property, there is no longer any controversy between the parties capable of supporting the jurisdiction of the court; and since a claim for rent may be determined in an unlawful detainer action only as an incident to the primary issue of possession, such claim must be pursued by an ordinary civil action once the possessory interest has been lost. [1] See Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant (1st ed. § 1016).<page_number>Page 545</page_number>

<bold>[1] Estoppel — Knowledge of Objectionable Condition — Effect of</bold> <bold>Assurance.</bold> A party is not estopped to complain of the erection of a chicken breeding plant near his residence because of the fact that he failed to object when he had knowledge that a substantial sum was being invested in the plant, where the complaining party was assured by the owner that he would suffer no objectionable effects from such plant. <bold>[2] Nuisance — Lawful Activity — Unreasonable Use of Property.</bold> A plant operated lawfully and in the best manner practicable with a sound operation may still constitute a nuisance if such an operation is an unreasonable use of the property, since not even a fee simple owner has a totality of rights with respect to his real property and he must not put the property to an unreasonable use relative to the use and enjoyment by another of his property. <bold>[3] Judgment — Estoppel by Judgment — Requisites.</bold> Whether a prior judgment will or will not operate as an estoppel by judgment in a subsequent action is dependent upon whether there has been a major factual change; and such a determination is made at the subsequent trial. <bold>[4] Appeal and Error — Review — Findings.</bold> Findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial evidence. [2] See Am. Jur., Nuisances (1st ed. §§ 16, 20).

<bold>[1] Automobiles — Right of Way — Deception — Requisites.</bold> A disfavored driver may escape liability for a collision resulting from his failure to yield the right of way to a favored driver only by proving that the favored driver so wrongfully and negligently operated his car as to create a deception tantamount to an entrapment. <bold>[2] Same — Right of Way — Deception — Clear Road.</bold> A disfavored driver who keeps a proper lookout can be deceived to the point of entrapment by the favored driver in a situation where his lookout reveals a clear stretch of road, only where the favored driver negligently operated his vehicle and his vehicle was concealed from prudent view by an obstruction. <bold>[3] Same — Violation of Statute — Negligence — Proximate Cause.</bold> While a plaintiff's violation of a driving statute in an automobile collision constitutes negligence per se, such violation does not bar plaintiff's recovery or warrant submitting the violation to the jury, unless there be substantial evidence that the violation proximately caused the accident; and the question of proximate cause is one of law, rather than of fact, where the facts are undisputed and the inferences therefrom are plain and not subject to reasonable doubt or difference of opinion. <bold>[4] Same — Violation of Statute — Negligence — Proximate Cause.</bold> A plaintiff's act in failing to signal his departure from a passenger stop cannot be said to have been the proximate cause of an intersection collision, where the defendant driver did not at any time observe the plaintiff's vehicle stopping, stopped, or moving from the curb.<page_number>Page 571</page_number> <bold>[5] Trial — Instructions — Theory of Case.</bold> A party is entitled to have his theory of the case covered in the instructions when there is substantial evidence to support it. [1] See Ann. 21 A.L.R. 981, 37 A.L.R. 502, 47 A.L.R. 602; Am.Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 200, 799.

<bold>[1] Homestead — Exemption Statutes — Construction.</bold> While the homestead exemption statutes, which do not protect, but are derogatory of, creditors' rights, are favored in the law and should be favorably construed, the homestead exemption must be filed in good faith as a shield to protect the homesteader and his dependents in the enjoyment of a domicile. <bold>[2] Judgment — Homestead — Judgment Lien.</bold> A money judgment does not become a lien from the date of the judgment upon property on which a homestead exemption has been established prior to judgment, except for certain statutory exceptions (RCW 6.12.100). <bold>[3] Equity — Liens — Equitable Liens — Absence of Remedy at</bold> <bold>Law.</bold> Where the prior establishment of a homestead exemption prevented a money judgment for the recovery of embezzled funds from becoming a lien at law upon real property purchased by the defendant with the embezzled funds, the court properly granted the plaintiff an equitable lien upon the property to enforce and secure the payment of the money judgment, since it is the function of an equitable lien to provide a just remedy in the absence of a similar remedy at law. <bold>[4] Same — Homestead — Exemption Statutes — Constructive Trust.</bold> One who has available a constructive trust or equitable lien remedy against property purchased with his funds by another may enforce it against such property, notwithstanding that the other has established a homestead exemption upon the property, since the homestead exemption statute cannot be used as an instrument of fraud and imposition. [4] See Ann. 43 A.L.R. 1415, 1446, 47 A.L.R. 371, 48 A.L.R. 1269; Am. Jur., Homestead (1st ed. § 113).