Lock v. Jenkins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. Iron County · Bailey v. Turner

2. ““Once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention____ And the fact that such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into punishment.” sji S-S !}! 5j« 5$: “Absent a showing of any expressed intent to punish on the part of the detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’ ... Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment’.” “Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintain ing jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions, that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Tyra v. Harger · 537 F. Supp. 993 - Union County Jail Inmates v. Scanlon

3. “... confinement of these detainees in a prison maintained primarily for the purpose of punishment of convicted persons, under conditions more burdensome than those imposed on the general population of convicted felons, amounts to punishment under Bell v. Wolfish. ****** Granting that the state’s interest in secure confinement of the safekeepers may justify confinement of particular detainees under restricted conditions because of their known characteristics, the additional severity of treatment in the absence of knowledge of their individual characteristics is clearly excessive and thus amounts to punishment under the Wolfish test. 441 U.S. at 538-39, 561 , 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74, 1885 . 641 F.2d at 494 . (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit also stated that: The prison officials here cannot justify the restrictive conditions imposed upon all safekeepers by referring to the officials ignorance of the reasons these pretrial detainees are sent to the prison. There may be individual safekeepers who must be kept in very restrictive conditions, but that determination must be made upon facts about the individual safekeeper provided by the committing court or discovered by the prison’s counseling staff. 641 F.2d at 494 . (emphasis added)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata. · 554 F. Supp. 1184 - Laster v. Duckworth