Grimes v. Haslett’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In the context of a general verdict comprising more than one issue the erroneous refusal to direct a verdict as to one issue constitutes grounds for a new trial unless the nonmoving party would prevail, as a matter of law, upon the other issue. “Where several issues of fact are tried and any one of them is erroneously submitted to the jury and a general verdict is returned for plaintiff, defendant is entitled to have the verdict set aside and to have a new trial, unless it conclusively appears as a matter of law that plaintiff was entitled to the verdict upon other grounds.” [Citation omitted.] The reason for requiring the new trial is the impossibility of knowing whether the general verdict was based upon a properly submitted issue or an improperly submitted issue. Schroht v. Voll, 245 Minn. 114 , 71 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn.1955). Accord Miracle Boot Puller Co. v. Plastray Corp., 84 Mich.App. 118 , 269 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich.App.1978); Duncan v. Germaine, 330 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.App.1976). Under this test, if it was error to submit either the negligence or causation questions to the jury, then a new trial is required unless Haslett was entitled to a verdict as a matter of law on the other question. Thus, we first inquire whether the superior court erred in not directing a verdict that Haslett was negligent or that she caused Grimes’ injuries.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Matomco Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc.

2. “Our review of the record discloses that, when the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to Haslett, reasonable persons could easily differ as to whether the October 9 collision caused the full extent of Grimes’ incapacity, but no reasonable juror could have concluded other than that Grimes suffered at least some damages. Grimes’ car was completely stopped when it was struck by Haslett’s car traveling at ten to fifteen miles per hour. Such a collision does not occur without some discomfort resulting to the occupants of the car that is struck.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bullard v. B. P. Alaska, Inc.

3. “Left turns onto business premises are a fairly routine traffic event. [Plaintiff] testified that the car ahead signalled before it turned, and that she had time to come to a complete stop: [Defendant], for no apparent reason, could not stop in time. [Defendant] admitted that she was probably following too close and that she felt that this caused the accident. Moreover, [Defendant] offered no proof that the accident was the fault of an unexpected occurrence.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Green v. Plutt