Ex Parte Wilkinson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"(b) The punishment for contempt of a court other than a justice court or municipal court is a fine of not more than $500 or confinement in the county jail for not more than six months, or both such a fine and confinement in jail. "(c) The punishment for contempt of a justice court or municipal court is a fine of not more than $100 or confinement in the county or city jail for not more than three days, or both such a fine and confinement in jail. "(d) An officer of a court who is held in contempt by a trial court shall, on proper motion filed in the offended court, be released on his own personal recognizance pending a determination of his guilt or innocence. The presiding judge of the administrative judicial region in which the alleged contempt occurred shall assign a judge who is subject to assignment by the presiding judge other than the judge of the offended court to determine the guilt or innocence of the officer of the court. "(e) This section does not affect a court's power to confine a contemner to compel him to obey a court order. "(f) Article 42.033, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Chapter 157, Family Code, apply when a person is punished by confinement for contempt of court for disobedience of a court order to make periodic payments for the support of a child. "(g) A court may not punish by contempt an employee or an agency or institution of this state for failure to initiate any program or to perform a statutory duly related to that program: "(1) if the legislatur”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Dotson

2. “In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters laws on the same subjects. Statutes which involve the same general subject matter and also possess the same general purpose are "in pari materia" even though the statutes may fail to contain any reference in one to the other and even though the statutes may have been passed at different times or at different legislative sessions. In order to arrive at a proper construction of a statute, and determine the exact legislative intent, all acts and parts of acts dealing with the same subject and having the same purpose will, therefore, be taken and read together, each enactment in reference to the other, as though they were parts of one and the same law. Thus, two statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed together, each enactment in reference to the other, as though they were part of one and the same law; any conflict between their provisions will be harmonized, if possible, and effect will be given to all the provisions of each act if they can be made to stand together and have concurrent efficacy. The rule proceeds on the supposition that several statutes relating to one subject are governed by one spirit and policy, and are intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions. Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another [statute] deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Vasilas

3. “If it can be argued, however, that said [statutes] are in pari materia, then under the rules of statutory construction the special statute, Article 20.15, would govern over ... the general statute. The two statutes are not, however, in pari materia. Article 20.15 and its forerunners have long been a part of our criminal procedural laws. The procedure involves only the district court and a witness who may be held in contempt for refusing to testify before the grand jury. [The general statute], enacted in 1971, deals with the contempt power of all courts concerning witnesses, officers of the court and others in a variety of situations. It is clear the two statutes are contained in different legislative acts, provide for different penalties, and are designed to serve different purposes and objectives. The provisions of the statutes are irreconcilable and the special statute, Article 20.15, must prevail under the rules of statutory construction. Although [the general statute] is the latter enactment, there is no manifest intent that the general provisions thereof relating to any act of contempt before any court control. 3”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Dotson