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← 642 F.2d 242 - Hixson v. Housewright

Hixson v. Housewright’s Empirical Analysis

642 F.2d 242 · 1981

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
June 1984
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · United States v. Harriss · Harris v. McRae · Maggitt v. Wyrick · United States v. Moody

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “However, deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise cannot be inferred solely from the fact that he did not subsequently perform the promise. There has to be an intent to deceive and in so doing to deprive another of his property. That is what the statute says and is what the jury found to have happened in this case. This criminal intent is in no way limited to present or past events. It is also aimed squarely at the sort of thing appellant was convicted of here. The Supreme Court has held that if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague. Also, if the general class of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, the court is under a duty to give it that construction. . . . Here, the general class of offenses, theft by deception or false pretenses, is within the terms of the Arkansas statute and we are duty bound to give it a construction which upholds its constitutionality in the circumstances present. The statute promotes a long-standing state interest in prohibiting deceptive schemes and confidence games. The crucial element of intent to deceive may be proven in many ways, such as has been done here, by showing the nature of the false impressions or misrepresentations, by showing the deceiving party lacked present or future ability to make good his representations, and by demonstrating an ongoing scheme or pattern of d”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(3) “Deception” means: (a) creating or reinforcing a false impression, including false impressions of fact, law, value or intention or other state of mind that the actor does not believe to be true .... Deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred solely from the fact that he did not subsequently perform the promise. Deception does not include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.