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← 642 F.3d 1122 - Bowie v. Maddox

Bowie v. Maddox’s Empirical Analysis

642 F.3d 1122 · 2011

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
May 2025
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 11 district · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1512 · 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1985 · 42 U.S.C. § 1986 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 Will County Illinois · Singleton v. Wulff · Garcetti v. Ceballos · Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation · Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “First, the public employee must have spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Second, the court must consider whether the governmental interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees outweighs the employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern. Third, the employee must show that [his] speech was a substantial or motivating factor in prompting the retaliatory or punitive act. Finally, the employee must refute the government employer’s showing, if made, that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected speech.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Bowie’s efforts to produce an affidavit were undertaken at the direction of his employer and in his capacity as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and Johnson's superior. The first version of the affidavit was drafted for OIG’s convenience by a Deputy Attorney General as counsel for OIG, and it was given to Bowie for his signature by ... OIG's general counsel. Bowie revised the affidavit on a timetable approved by the general counsel, and then submitted it to her for submission with ... OIG’s position statement in the EEOC. Bowie does not allege Defendants stymied any personal effort to submit his affidavit to the EEOC or to Johnson directly. Indeed, Bowie made no such effort. His affidavit, like the draft he refused to sign, identified him in the first paragraph and signature block as 'Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.’ All the speech underlying Bowie's First Amendment claim occurred in his official capacity.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[i]t is precisely because an untrained pro se party may be unable to identify and articulate the potentially meritorious arguments in his case that we sometimes exercise our discretion to appoint amici.” Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122 , 1135 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.2011). 7 . The Government argues the relevant language in Chastain is dicta, as the”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.