DeCastro v. Branker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 9”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Richardson v. Branker · Waddell v. Department of Correction

2. “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show “that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Regarding the first prong, a “deficient” performance is one that falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 511 [, 123 S.Ct. 2527 ]. Petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment.” Harrington, [562 U.S. at -], 131 S.Ct. at 787 (internal quotations marks omitted). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”). [A court’s] deferential assessment of counsel’s performance must “include [] a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, we must resist the temptation to “second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence” and make “every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . Indeed, we must review with “scrupulous care,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 917 F. Supp. 2d 471 - Moore v. Keller

3. “Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Waddell v. Department of Correction