United States v. McCrary’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 federal appellate · 1 district · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]t is difficult to discern how a waiver of these rights could be knowing, intelligent and voluntary where the suspect is totally unaware of the offense upon which the questioning is based. A valid waiver of constitutional rights does not occur in a vacuum. [A] waiver of the right to counsel and right to remain silent occurs in response to a particular set of facts involving a particular offense. The Miranda warnings are given not solely to make the suspect aware of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing the privilege.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. People v. Spring · United States Ex Rel. Abubake v. Redman

2. “It is possible that in some situations the fact that the suspect was not aware of the offense under investigation would be of concern to the court in evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a statement. This is quite different, however, from a holding that unless the information is included in the pre-interrogation litany, a confession is per se inadmissible. We need not and do not decide this question, however, since our inquiry may be limited to the issue of whether the ‘waiver’ was ineffective because it was signed before the petitioner was advised of the nature of the crime with which the interrogation was concerned. * * * * * * [AJssuming, arguendo, only that Collins was not told about the reason he was to be questioned until after he had signed the document in police headquarters, we conclude nevertheless that the statement was admissible. The ‘waiver’ which is referred to in the majority opinion in Miranda is explained in the dissent of Justice Harlan as being some type of affirmative statement of rejection of rights. As the Court points out, however, a suspect has the privilege at any time of refusing to answer questions or to continue without the presence of counsel, and hence, the ‘waiver’ has no enforceable effect whatsoever. It may be assumed that its main purpose is evi-dentiary, to establish with a minimum of difficulty and a maximum of certainty that the police gave the warnings and that the suspect had agreed — preliminar”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 434 So. 2d 967 - State v. Williams

3. “"We are simply not prepared to suppress the fruits of this search on the basis of such artificial technicalities as who called whom, who asked whom to go along, who rode in the first car and who was driving, who read the warrant to the Appellees, who searched where, who found what, et cetera. This search was a cooperative venture by municipal, county, and federal law enforcement officers.... [The municipal police officer's] participation being authorized, we cannot suppress merely because he assumed the initiative in the execution of this search warrant."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 473 So. 2d 1188 - Gamble v. State