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← 643 S.E.2d 458 - In Re CLK

In Re CLK’s Empirical Analysis

2007

Citation profile

2
cited by 2 later decisions
1
states following
August 2008
most recently cited

2 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Koufman v. Koufman · Viar v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · 156 N.C. App. 533 - In Re Humphrey · In Re DJD · 171 N.C. App. 230 - In re D.J.D.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “I am troubled by our unexamined assumption that a permissible and appropriate remedy for delayed entry of the termination of parental rights order is to reverse the order and remand for a new hearing. In the usual case, reversal is an appropriate remedy precisely because the error at issue casts doubt on the outcome or verdict in the proceeding. A new trial or hearing is then required to ensure the fairness of the result in a case. In contrast, the delayed entry of an order for termination of parental rights does not cast doubt on the integrity of the decision. Additionally, reversal of the order with its associated further delay does nothing to remedy the late entry of the termination order. . . . Ironically, this Court's decision to require a new termination of parental rights hearing generally delays finality for at least another year. This compounds the delay in obtaining permanence for the child, and continues the status quo concerning parents' lack of access to their children. Simply put, the "remedy" of reversing bears no relationship whatsoever to the wrong that it seeks to redress. More significantly, I know of no statutory basis for our authority to reverse in this circumstance. Reversing orders on termination for the trial court's procedural failure to enter an order within the statutory duration is a draconian result that benefits no one.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “With respect to respondent's delayed ability to appeal, the majority opinion has failed to explain in what manner that factor prejudiced respondent. If respondent desired to appeal more quickly, it was within his power to request that the court enter its order so that an appeal could be taken.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
    e.g. In Re THT

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.