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643 S.W.2d 737

Lynch v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided January 12, 1983

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1983-01-12

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(a) It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Gardner v. State, King v. State

“The offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle requires proof of the forbidden conduct and the attendant circumstances of the crime. The State had to show at a minimum that the appellant knowingly operated the motor vehicle of another (the conduct element) without the effective consent of the owner (the attendant circumstances element). Under the approach adopted by Section 6.03 the mental state requirement applies to the attendant circumstances element as well as to the conduct element of the offense. A person acts knowingly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware that the circumstances exist. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 6.03(b). In other words, knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is an element of the instant offense.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Gardner v. State

Relies on Musgrave v. State · Montgomery v. State · London v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-01-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently October 2010 · most notably McQueen v. State (1989), Woodfox v. State (1987)

25 state decisions

1601983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*738 OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

ODOM, Judge.

¶2 Appellant was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 31.07. Punishment, enhanced under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 12.42(d), is life. Appellant’s petition to review the Court of Appeals’ decision, 635 S.W.2d 172 (1982), was granted so that we could consider whether it was error to refuse appellant’s requested charge on the defense of mistake of fact. V.T.C.A., Penal Code See. 8.02.

¶3 Appellant testified in his own behalf, telling the jury in substance that an acquaintance had given him the keys to the van in question so he could borrow the van to pick up his motorcycle from a repair shop. The question is whether the defensive evidence raised the issue of mistake of fact, because if it did appellant was entitled to an affirmative submission of the issue. Montgomery v. State, 588 S.W.2d 950; London v. State, 547 S.W.2d 27.

¶4 Sec. 8.02, supra, provides in relevant part:

“(a) It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.”

¶5 The Court of Appeals overruled the ground of error because the charge on the offense required the jury to find the intent element of the offense. This approach overlooked the rule that entitles a defendant to an affirmative submission of defenses raised by the evidence. See Montgomery and London, supra. The Court of Appeals relied on Musgrave v. State, 608 S.W.2d 184. That case, however, concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The issue presented here is whether the evidence raised the defense of mistake of fact. Here appellant presented evidence that his use of the van was with the permission of the person who gave him the keys and who was apparently authorized to consent to use of the vehicle. To hold such innocent use is no defense would be to make Sec. 31.07, supra, a strict liability offense. The evidence raised the issue of whether appellant was operating under a mistake of fact. It was error to refuse the requested charge on that defense.

¶6 The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court.

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