United States v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis
644 F.2d 101 · 1981
Citation profile
34 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 48 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2012 · most notably Smith v. Phillips (1982), Tinsley v. Borg (1990)
34 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Swain v. State of Alabama · Reynolds v. States · Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission · Dennis v. United States · Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[B]y having the defendant utter the threatening and menacing words that the robber had allegedly used, the Government ... gave the defendant an aura of criminality, thus providing a strong suggestion to the jury of his guilt. It is hard for me to conceive of a more prejudicial method of establishing a voice identification. Only if the jury had gone down to the bank and watched the defendant put on a ski mask, wave a toy gun, and shout "Give me your money or I'm going to blow you up," could Brown have been worse off. I know of no case certainly neither the Government in its brief nor the majority in its opinion has found one which justifies the use of an in-court identification procedure as suggestive and prejudicial as the one used here. [ Id. at 106-07 .]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"This Circuit has generally relied on the trial court's discretion, absent clear abuse, in ruling on challenges for cause in the empanelling of a jury. . . . In order for a trial judge's determination of a juror's impartiality to be set, aside there must be shown `manifest' prejudice. "In Mikus v. United States , 433 F.2d 719 (1970), this court declined to find that certain occupations or relationships per se constituted grounds for a prospective juror's dismissal . . . The court chose not `to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case'. . . . "On these bases we choose not to follow United States v. Allsup, supra. Consistent with our decision in Mikus v. United States, supra , we do not wish to institute a series of presumptions of implied bias in other employment or familial relationships which might affect a juror's impartiality." 644 F.2d at 104-05 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“'create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Smith v. Phillips
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.