Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

644 F. Supp. 867

Thompson v. Heckemeyer

U.S. District Court

Decided September 25, 1986

U.S. District Court · decided 1986-09-25

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently January 1987

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Pierson v. Ray · Stump v. Sparkman · Pargoud v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1986-09-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1ORDER

LIMBAUGH, District Judge.

¶2This cause is before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has responded to this motion and has, in addition, filed a motion for a temporary restraining *868order or preliminary injunction and a motion to disqualify defendant’s counsel.

¶3In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action, plaintiff Douglas Thompson contends that defendant Judge Anthony Heckemeyer has violated his civil rights by interfering with his right to be free on parole. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the judge has acted unconstitutionally and an injunction precluding defendant from exercising his influence with the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole. Thompson also requests an award of actual and punitive damages.

¶4Plaintiff’s claim concerns actions taken by Judge Heckemeyer within the scope of his duties as a judge. Consequently, defendant can claim the benefit of immunity from plaintiff’s claim for damages. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1108, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872); and Wiggins v. Hess, 531 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir.1976) (per curiam). Defendant has immunity from a suit for damages even if he acted maliciously. Wiggins, 531 F.2d at 921.

¶5Plaintiff’s request for equitable relief presents a different problem. Thompson seeks a declaration that the state has improperly confined him in the state penitentiary, and an injunction rectifying the situation. Since plaintiff is challenging the fact of his incarceration, he must raise his assertions in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus. Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d 362, 364 (8th Cir.1981); and Seltzer v. Ashcroft, 675 F.2d 184, 185 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860, 104 S.Ct. 185, 78 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984).

¶6Accordingly,

¶7IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss is SUSTAINED.

¶8IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and motion to disqualify the Missouri Attorney General’s Office are DENIED as moot.

/644/fsupp/867 · .json · Public domain