People v. Pancoast’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[I]n United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980), Justice Stewart, in an opinion announcing the judgment of the court, recently stated that the determination of the issue whether a person has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must be resolved by an objective standard — that is whether ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ This objective standard is consistent with Colorado case law on the meaning of ‘custody’ for purposes of the Miranda warning. People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1 , 501 P.2d 468 (1972); People v. Marioneaux, Colo.App., 618 P.2d 678 (1980). “In this case the district court must determine upon remand whether the defendant was arrested in his home or, instead, voluntarily consented to accompany the officer to the station house to answer questions about a burglary. The court’s resolution of the arrest issue must be made under the ‘reasonable person’ standard. In this respect the court must assess the totality of circumstances surrounding the officer’s encounter with the defendant. Pertinent factors include the following: the time, place and purpose of the encounter; the words used by the officer, his tone of voice and general demeanor in requesting the defendant to accompany him to the police station; the officer’s statements to others who were present during the encounter; the manner in which the defendant”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. Bookman

2. ““Admittedly, when a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person in a constitutional sense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903 (1968). It does not follow, however, that every personal confrontation between a police officer and a citizen, which results in some form of interrogation directed to the citizen, necessarily involves a ‘seizure’ of the person. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (defendant’s compliance with officer’s request that he come to police station to discuss something, and ensuing station house interrogation, during which defendant confessed to burglary, not a ‘custodial interrogation’ so as to require Miranda advisement prior to questioning). ‘Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [a court] conclude that “a seizure” has occurred.’ Terry v. Ohio, supra [392 U.S.] at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905 n. 16. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980), Justice Stewart, in an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, recently stated that the determination of the issue whether a person has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must be resolved by an objective standard — that is whether ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a r”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. Lewis