644 So. 2d 1368 - McRae v. Douglas’s Empirical Analysis
1994
Citation profile
8 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently September 2012
8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill · Perry v. Sindermann · Bishop v. Wood · Owens v. Okure
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“An individual may, in a public employment context, establish entitlement to procedural due process under the United States and Florida Constitutions, by showing a property interest in his or her position. The concept of a property interest has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as a legitimate expectation of continued employment. Such legitimate expectations of continued employment establishing property interests are not created by the United States Constitution, rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state law. Consequently, [the appellant] had to sufficiently allege a property interest in his position under Florida law in order to establish his entitlement to any procedural due process safeguards.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“A sheriff is authorized to appoint deputies for whose acts he is responsible, to act in his stead.... A deputy sheriff holds office by appointment, rather than by employment, and is thus an officer, rather than an employee.... The sheriff has absolute control over the selection and retention of deputies in order that law enforcement be centralized in the county, and in order that the people be able to place responsibility upon a particular officer for failure of law enforcement.... Thus, a deputy sheriff has no property interest in his office and no constitutional due process protections when he is dismissed.... Neither does he acquire a contract right by virtue of a disciplinary procedure unilaterally adopted by the sheriff, which the sheriff may similarly modify or completely revoke at will.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“(1) “Law enforcement officer” means any person, other than a chief of police, who is employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state; and includes any person who is appointed by the sheriff as a deputy sheriff pursuant to s. 30.07.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.