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645 P.2d 1155

Bereman v. Bereman

Wyoming Supreme Court

Decided May 27, 1982

Wyoming Supreme Court · decided 1982-05-27

Relies on Kinnison v. Kinnison

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-05-27

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably Zimmerman v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Rapid City, S.D. (1988), Cordova v. Gosar (1986)

2 federal appellate · 35 state decisions

22019821990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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ROSE, Chief Justice,

¶1specially concurring.

¶2I would have believed that the court could not set aside the contract (i.e., cancel the debt) for $30,000 which, to me, is an agreement to pay and receive money according to certain terms entered into between two persons competent and able to contract with one another. While the appellant argues that the court cannot do this, he presents no authority to that effect and I have found none. I suppose that it can be said that the court did nothing more in cancelling the debt than it would have done if it had let the debt stand and then ordered the husband to pay $30,000 to the wife as a part of the property settlement. Nobody would have questioned the court’s ability to do this.

¶3For these reasons, I will concur.

ROONEY, Justice,

¶4specially concurring.

¶5I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I agree with the reasoning in the majority opinion with reference to the issue relative to payment of $500.00 per month child support by John (appellant in case No. 5613 and appellee in case No. 5613A), and relative to the payment of $2,000.00 attorney fees by John. I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either instance.

¶6The other issues1 related to alleged occurrences, contractual and otherwise, which concerned the relationship between the parties during the time they cohabited without marriage. In my dissent to Kinnison v. Kinnison, Wyo., 627 P.2d 594, 597 (1981), I set forth in detail my reasons (1) for not recognizing the validity of contracts or other occurrences which are contrary to law, morality and public policy, and (2) for considering palimony-type claims resulting from cohabitation without marriage to fall within such categories. Therefore, I will not again detail the reasons here. These other issues arise from cohabitation without marriage; and for the reasons stated in my dissent in Kinnison, the court should not assist either party with reference to these other issues. The parties should be left in the situation in which they placed themselves. In effect, the trial court did so.

¶7Upon this basis, I would affirm.

¶8. Whether or not the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to receive evidence, under contract theories, relative to increase in value of John’s estate during the time the parties cohabited without marriage; (2) in refusing to receive evidence relative to increase in value of a Cody residence during the time the parties cohabited without marriage; and (3) in cancelling a debt of approximately $72,000.00 owed by Loujen (appellant in case No. 5613A and appellee in case No. 5613) to John (including a $30,000.00 promissory note), which was incurred during the time the parties cohabited without marriage.

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