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645 So. 2d 961

Docket No. 82394.

Langley v. Singletary

Leonard R. LANGLEY, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, etc., Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided August 25, 1994.

Rehearing Denied December 8, 1994.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1994-08-25

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently April 2002

7 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[A]dministrative gain time and provisional credits were temporary devices for achieving federally mandated reduction in prison overcrowding.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Meola v. Department of Corrections, Adams v. Department of Corrections

Relies on Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional Institution Walpole v. Hill · 638 So. 2d 500 - Griffin v. Singletary

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1994-08-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Leonard R. Langley, pro se.

¶2Susan A. Maher, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Corrections, Tallahassee, for respondent.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Leonard R. Langley petitions this Court for habeas corpus, which we treat as a petition for writ of mandamus. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.

¶5We note Langley's argument that our opinion in Griffin v. Singletary,638 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1994), should not be applicable to the cancellation of his provisional gain time. He correctly notes that Griffin dealt in part with revocation of provisional gain time for certain serious offenses, pursuant to an Attorney General's opinion.

¶6However, Langley overlooks the fact that section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993), voided all provisional gain time for every inmate serving a sentence or combined sentence in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. In Griffin, we noted that this across-the-board cancellation eliminated any question of arbitrariness and therefore of any conceivable need for the Department to hold individual cancellation proceedings. We also noted that there is no due-process violation in such a legislative cancellation. Griffin.

¶7Even if a more stringent review were needed here — which we do not decide — we also believe the legislature has met the "some evidence" standard suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill,472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); see Griffin. As Respondent notes, administrative gain time and provisional credits were temporary devices for achieving federally mandated reduction in prison overcrowding. The legislature now has determined that the problem has lessened and that other devices are available that render administrative gain time and provisional credits redundant or unnecessary. These devices include increased building of prisons, front-end diversionary programs, and certain other early release programs. Accordingly, all relief is denied.

¶8It is so ordered.

¶9*962 GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.

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