647 So. 2d 1 - Seritt v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The appellant contends that the indictments in cases CC-92-1552, charging the capital offenses of murder committed during the course of a robbery in the first degree, and CC-92-1553, charging the capital offense of murder of two or more persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, were multiplicitous because, he says, they charged him, twice for the intentional murders of Freddie Barber and Linda Barber. He also argues that his convictions on these charges violated his constitutional right not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense because they arose out of the same incident, i.e., the killing of Freddie Barber and Linda Barber. “An indictment is multiplicitous if a single offense is alleged in more than one count, and the effect is to prejudice the jury by suggesting that more than one offense has been committed. 42 C.J.S.,- supra, § 160. In this case, the trial court, on-motion of the state, consolidated the four indictments, including the two indictments under discussion here, for trial. As we hold in part XXV, infra, this consolidation was proper. In arguing multiplicity, the appellant is asking that we treat his indictments as one because they were consolidated. If we so treat them, the question becomes whether the two capital murder charges charged a single offense. This, in turn, brings us to the double jeopardy question. “In regard to the double jeopardy argument, one indictment charged the appellant with the intentional killing of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 57 So. 3d 807 - Lewis v. State

2. ““Even if the prosecutor’s remark had been impermissible, we fail to see how it prejudiced the jury so as to require reversal. A prosecutor’s remark requires reversal only ‘if the remark “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’ Davis v. State, 494 So.2d 851 , [853] (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 , 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 828 So. 2d 879 - Harris v. State