648 So. 2d 638 - Stanton v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Random selection from a list of licensed drivers has been held to be an acceptable manner in which to select a jury.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gavin v. State · 776 So. 2d 819 - Travis v. State

2. “"`"`. . . . In the absence of a showing of systematic exclusion, the showing of a disparity between the percentage of blacks in the population of the county in which venue is situated and the percentage of blacks on the venire does not establish a violation of the fair cross section requirement.' Stewart v. State , 623 So.2d 413 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gavin v. State · 790 So. 2d 975 - Acklin v. State

3. “"`Under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, the trial court must invoke its provisions in "all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any [felony or] felonies and after such conviction[ (s) ] has committed another felony." § 13A-5-9[ (a), (b), (c), Code of Alabama (1975)]. Appellant argues that where a defendant enters a plea of guilty, but has not been sentenced, and then commits another felony, that no "conviction" exists which can the be used against him for sentence enhancement purposes. In the present case, evidence was introduced at the sentencing hearing which indicated that the appellant had entered guilty pleas to two felony offenses, and, seven days later, before the trial court had sentenced him, committed the present offense. "`As this Court has noted, a "plea of guilty is a conviction itself." Jones v. State, 431 So.2d 1367, 1372 (Ala.Cr. App.1983). Thus, it would appear to be proper, in the present case, to invoke the provisions of the Act. Appellant, however, argues that the two felony offense to which he had pleaded guilty were not "final" at the time he committed the present offense, since sentence had not been entered. It is apparent that appellant's argument is an attempt to interpolate the word "final" into the provisions of the Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act. Based upon the plain wording of the statute, however, such a position is without merit.'" "See also Summerhill v. State, 436 So.2d 2, 5 (Ala.Cr.App.1983”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Morgan v. State