¶1concurring.
¶2I concur in the reversal for the inclusion of an improper definition of reasonable doubt to which the appellant properly objected.
¶3The term “reasonable doubt” is not normally defined in a Texas criminal case. A host of cases hold that it should not be defined. See, e.g., Massey v. State, 1 Tex. App. 563, 570 (1877); Fury v. State, 8 Tex. App. 471 (1880);“ McPhail v. State, 9 Tex. App. 164 (1880); Cohea v. State, 9 Tex.App. 173 (1880); Schultz v. State, 20 Tex.App. 315 (1886); Johnson v. State, 27 Tex.App. 163, 11 S.W. 106 (1889); Lenert v. State, 63 S.W. 563 (Tex.Cr.App.1901); Holmes v. State, 68 Tex.Cr.R. 17, 150 S.W. 926 (Tex. Cr.App.1912); Sanchez v. State, 69 Tex. Cr.R. 1134, 153 S.W. 1133 (Tex.Cr.App.1913); Marshall v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 386, 175 S.W. 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1915); Bennett v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 422, 239 S.W. 951 (Tex. Cr.App.1922); Sagu v. State, 94 Tex.Cr.R. 14, 248 S.W. 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1923); Gallegos v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 508, 215 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1948); Pierce v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 504, 265 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Cr.App.1954); Pigg v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 521, 287 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Cr.App.1956). Cf. Whitson v. State, 495 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Thus in Texas only a nondefinitional charge on “reasonable doubt” is normally given in a criminal case.
¶4While a charge defining reasonable doubt may pass muster, this court does not con*4done the giving of such a charge. Since this is a published opinion, I believe this court should once again call this to the attention of the judges of this state and warn of the dangers inherent in attempting to define reasonable doubt.
¶5I concur.