¶1I dissent. The majority opinion easily persuades me that “voice identification is not within the privilege against self-incrimination,” and that the rule of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229], is inapplicable when the defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to speak solely for purposes of voice identification.
¶2Our problem ends with the foregoing determination. The adoption of yet another rule for police procedure adds a superfluous burden to what the majority has appropriately called ‘ ‘ a system dedicated to ascertainment of truth. ’ ’
¶3A defendant warned that he has a right to remain silent understands he cannot be compelled to give a statement relating to the offense he is suspected of committing. But certainly he cannot reasonably infer from the mandatory admonition that he may remain mute thereafter for all purposes. He is required to respond when asked his name, address, place of employment, next of kin, name of his attorney, and other relevant biographical information. When he goes to court, he may be asked similar questions, and generally he is expected to personally announce his plea (Pen. Code, §1018). Queries of that type and the vocal response are designed not to effectuate self-incrimination but to achieve an orderly administration of justice.
¶4Of a more substantive nature are other permissible efforts of the state to obtain the facts necessary for ascertainment of the truth, through fingerprinting, photographing, measuring the suspect; imprinting a portion of the suspect’s body; physical *543examination of the body; removal of or placing articles of clothing on the suspect; requiring the suspect to stand, assume a stance, walk, make a particular gesture, to write for identification ; requiring the suspect to appear in a lineup and in court; or listening to his voice. (8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) pp. 387-399.) Nothing in Griffin suggests the impropriety of commenting on defendant’s refusal to render at least passive cooperation with the foregoing procedures. Indeed, Griffin is limited to prohibiting “comment on the refusal to testify . . . [because it] is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. ’ ’ (P. 614.)
¶5I harbor serious doubts as to the ability of peace officers to devise a comprehensible warning, as required by the majority, that will “distinguish between speech in terms of communication and speech for voice identification, between a refusal to speak free from sanctions and a refusal to speak productive of detrimental inferences.” If this is too subtle a distinction for laymen, it is equally so for those in the field of law enforcement.
¶6Since we found no self-incrimination problem involved here and Griffin is inapplicable, I perceive no bar to affirming the judgment and I worild do so.
¶7McComb, J., concurred.