Baltimore & O. R. v. Camp’s Empirical Analysis
65 F. 952 · 1895
Citation profile
19 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently November 1927
19 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Baltimore Co v. Baugh · Randall v. Baltimore O R · Wabash Ry Co v. McDaniels · MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY v. Nelson · Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Ross
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““He and the engineer and the conductor work together, at the samp time and place, íor a common employer, with an immediate common object, namely, the proper running of trains. It is essential, in the operating department of a railroad company, that there should be provision for communicating to those in charge of different trains the whereabouts of other trains, to avoid collision. This information is given by means of the general time-table and general rules for the running of trains with reference to each other, which the employes in charge of each train are obliged implicitly to obey. But it often happens that the general time-table must be varied from, and these variations must be communicated to those in charge of trains. This is effected usually by telegraphic orders from the superintendent or the train dispatcher, who has supreme control of the running of trains. The information is also communicated by means of flagmen, by means of torpedoes, by red lights and green lights upon trains, by the block-signal system, and in other ways. The subordinate employes, whose duty it is to transmit the orders of the officer in control, or to give information as to the presence of trains upon any part of the track, without special orders, arc engaged at the same time and place with the persons operating the train, in a common employment, having an immediate, common object, namely, that of the running of trains, and therefore are fellow servants. The man who makes the signal at the s”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““It is contended that these signals are in the nature of orders or commands, which the engineer is authorized to give to brakemen, which they are bound to obey, and hence the relation as superior and subordinate is created. A majority of the court do not so understand either the purpose or effect of the rule. These signals are so named properly, and are intended to notify all concerned of the thing signified. They are addressed to the conductor as well as brakemen, and it is the duty of the conductor to see that brakemen perform the duty signified. This duty is imposed upon the brakemen by force of the rule itself, and not by virtue of any authority vested in the engineer over the brakemen. The signal is a mere notice. The rule is'the order of the compans’- to the brakeman directly. Suppose a train is signaled by a station agent, as this train was, to stop for orders. It thereby became the doty of the conductor, as well as of each employ? on the train, to stop for orders; and yet no one can contend that such station agent, who gives the signal, is the superior and the train crew subordinate employes of the company, within the moaning of the rule under consideration. ' A variety ol' signals, under a variety of circumstances, are required to be given by different employes of the company, to signify that an occasion exists for the performance of a particular duty; but it would be absurd to hold that, in each case, the employe giving the signal is a superior servant, to whom all ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““In our opinion, the telegraph operator has neither power nor authority to direct or control tl«> engineer. Ho is only the medium through whom orders from the train dispatcher are communicated to the engineer and the conductor. He gives notice to the engineer and the conductor. He gives notice to the onginer of certain facts from which the duty of the engineer arises under the rules of the company. The conductor is in control of the train, and the engineer and the brakemen are his subordinates. Suppose that the conductor sends an order to the engineer by the brakemen: does the hrakeman thereby become a person actually having power or authority to direct or control the engineer? Clearly not. The duty of the switchman in such a case is merely 1.0 give notice to the engineer of the condition of affairs upon which the engineer is required to act. And so the engineer's duty to act upon the signal from the telegraph operator does not come from any authority or power to control reposed in the telegraph operator. The authority or control is in the train dispatcher, who gives the order, not in the mere transmitter of it. When there is no order, but the telegraph operator conveys by signal to the engineer information as to the position of other trains or the condition of the track ahead, the operator is the mere register of the fact, a mere no tiller, a mere giver of information upon which the engineer, under the rules of the company, at once knows his duty and acts accordingly.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.