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← 65 F.2d 459 - McCabe v. Cramblet

McCabe v. Cramblet’s Empirical Analysis

65 F.2d 459 · 1933

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
March 1984
most recently cited

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently March 1984

30193319401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on McCarty v. Lehigh Val R Co · Deibel v. Heise & Schumacher · Brogden v. Slater · Field v. Stow · Atherton v. Payne

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The first question for consideration is whether there is any patentable distinction between the counts here involved and said claims 1 to 5 of appellant’s patent; or, in other words, do the claims of said patent and the counts of the interference call for the same invention? If they do, it is well established that limitations in the claims of appellant’s patent having no patentable significance may under certain circumstances, be ignored, and an interference based upon claims of appellant’s patent is proper 'with such immaterial limitations omitted. Neither is it necessary that the exact wording of the patentable elements ■of the claims of appellant’s patent be copied; the test is whether the counts of the interference and the claims of the patent call for the same invention. If they do, an interference between them is proper. In re Ellis & Holden, 47 F.(2d) 968 , 18 COPA [Patents] 1060, and cases cited.” [Emphasis ours.] The distinction between “interference in fact” and “right to make” problems, furthermore, is not merely one of semantics. As Commissioner Allen stated in the Blackmore case: “Observation of the distinction between dissolution for non-interference in fact, on the one hand, and dissolution for lack of right to claim or non-patenta’bility, on the other hand, is a matter of ■consequence and not mere technicality.” Under present Patent Office practice, this “matter of consequence” is, as discussed above, that dissolution of the instant interference for non-inter”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Appellant insists that such limitation should be read into the claims, and that when so read, the counts here involved do not call for the same invention as that embraced in the claims of appellant’s patent. However, as said by the Supreme Court in the case of McCarty v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 160 U.S. 110 [ 16 S.Ct. 240 , 40 L.Ed. 358 ], “ * * * we know of no principle of law which would authorize us to read into a claim an element which is not present, for the purpose of making out a case of novelty or infringement.” If appellant’s disclosure in his patent with respect to the two terminals being in relatively close proximity to each other be of patentable significance, that element should have been expressed in the claims of his patent if he desired to receive protection therefor. Appellant having elected to claim the invention broadly with respect to the positioning of the terminals at the points of entering the tube, is not in a position to insist that limitations be read into his claims for the purpose of avoiding the issue of priority. Deibel v. Heise & Schumacher, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 907, 46 F.2d 570 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.