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← 65 F.3d 43 - St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Compensation Commission

St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Compensation Commission’s Empirical Analysis

65 F.3d 43 · 1995

Citation profile

45
cited by 45 later decisions
3
states following
May 2014
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 3 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 45 later decisions — most recently May 2014 · most notably Fisher v. Johnson (1999), Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (1997)

16 federal appellate · 3 district · 4 state decisions

290199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 626 (§ 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967)

Relies on Landgraf v. USI Film Products · Soberon v. United States · Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown · Latimer v. Stainer · Federal Deposit Insurance v. Ernst & Young

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “If a charge filed with the Commission under this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this section by a person defined in section 630(a) of this title against the respondent named in the charge within 90 days after the date of receipt of such notice.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “first, whether the EEOC provided adequate notice of the complainant’s right to sue; second, whether a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted upon; third, whether the court itself has led the plaintiff to believe that she has done everything required of her; and fourth, whether affirmative misconduct on the part of the defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Land-graf. ... To determine whether retroactivity concerns bar application of an intervening statute to any given case ... we must decide whether the intervening statute has a genuinely ‘retroactive’ effect____ In this case, the change in the statute of limitations for filing ADEA claims does not have a retroactive effect; it governs the secondary conduct of filing suit, not the primary conduct of the defendants. Indeed, although the defendant frames the issue as one of retroactivity, the issue is not technically one of retroactivity, where a change in the law overturns an adjudication of rights that has already become final. In this ease, the statute of limitations is applied to conduct that occurred after the statute’s enactment — the plaintiffs filing of the complaint — not to the allegedly discriminatory acts of the defendant.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.