65 F. Supp. 2d 1124 - Alire v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Plaintiff relies heavily on Poodry , asserting that her ‘exclusion’ from the Reservation in this case is analogous to the permanent banishment in Poodry and this is a criminal proceeding, giving this court jurisdiction. Defendant, on the other hand, relies on [Santa Clara Pueblo ] ..., asserting that plaintiffs exclusion is more analogous to the membership decision at issue in [Santa Clara Pueblo ] than to the banishment at issue in Poodry . Both parties also argue that this court should recognize ‘exclusion’ proceedings as always civil or always criminal in nature. I decline to do so. The permanent banishment imposed on the plaintiffs in Poodry had a close nexus in time and scope to their alleged criminal activities. Consequently, the Second Circuit had no difficulty arriving at the reasonable conclusion that the banishment was a criminal sanction. Exclusions that lack a similar close nexus, however, are not necessarily construed as criminal proceedings. In Hardin v. White ..., for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusion of a nonmember from tribal lands was an exercise of a tribe’s civil jurisdiction. Plaintiff in this case asserts that her exclusion was punishment for her earlier criminal conviction. The evidence, however, does not support her claim. In her affidavit, plaintiff states that in connection with her plea bargain, the judge gave her only ‘a warning of exclusion.’ ... The actual exclusion order was made seven months after plaintiffs criminal conviction”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 - Quair v. Sisco

2. “Because we conclude the tribal action in this case arose in a criminal context, we ultimately need not resolve the question of whether habeas review is restricted to cases involving a tribal criminal conviction. The respondents’ argument that the banishment orders issued against the petitioners reflected a ‘civil’ determination relies principally on the Supreme Court’s recognition in Santa Clara Pueblo that a tribe’s right to define its membership is central to its autonomy ... The respondents claim that Santa Clara Pueblo makes clear that (1) a federally recognized Indian nation possesses ‘complete and absolute authority to determine all questions of its own membership.’ ...; and (2) membership determinations ‘are considered civil in nature, regardless of the tribal values informing such determination.’ Santa Clara Pueblo in fact supports neither statement. The first — that authority to determine membership questions is ‘complete and absolute’' — simply goes too far. While Congress has deferred with regularity to tribal membership determinations ..., there is little question that the power to define membership is subject to limitation by Congress ... Whether § 1302 of the ICRA does in fact impose any limits on tribal authority to determine questions of membership in the tribe is a question on the merits, and one not resolved in Santa Clara Pueblo . The second point — that all membership determinations are ‘civil in nature’ — is nowhere suggested or implied in Santa Clara Pue”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 - Quair v. Sisco