65 F. Supp. 2d 591 - Walker v. Bain’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

cited by 16 later decisions

June 2013

most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 2 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently June 2013

2 federal appellate · 2 district ·

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Criminal Justice Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1915A · 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 42 U.S.C. § 1997E

Relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart · Bell v. Wolfish · Will v. Michigan Department of State Police · City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center · Allen v. Wright

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

“ATTORNEY’S FEES — No attorney's fee under section 722 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1988) may be granted to a plaintiff in a civil action with respect to prison conditions except to the extent such fee is— (1) directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's Federal rights; and (2) proportionally related to the extent the plaintiff obtains court ordered relief for that violation.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage
e.g. 108 F. Supp. 2d 842 - McLindon v. Russell · 104 F. Supp. 2d 892 - Wolff v. Moore
“There is no defensible interest served by focusing on th[e] distinction between prisoners and nonprisoners, since it bears no relationship whatever to the purpose of either the attorney fee provision of § 1988 or the cap on such fees provided by § 1997e(d)(2). The only manner in which the distinction between prisoners and nonprisoners relates to the goal of protecting the public fisc is by making prisoners (or the pro bono attorney) bear the entire extent of that burden for no other reason than the fact that they are prisoners (or attorneys who have undertaken to represent prisoners). Such an arbitrary discrimination, as the cases discussed above demonstrate, is not a permissible means of guarding the state's purse. Accordingly, I conclude that there is no rational relationship between the distinction made by § 1997e(d)(2) and the purported goal of protecting the public fisc.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
e.g. 108 F. Supp. 2d 842 - McLindon v. Russell · 104 F. Supp. 2d 892 - Wolff v. Moore
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section [ ] ... 1983 ... of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
e.g. 108 F. Supp. 2d 842 - McLindon v. Russell · 104 F. Supp. 2d 892 - Wolff v. Moore

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.