citation">188 Ga. 75,2 S.E.2d 632), and that a sister of the deceased, who was the one nearest of kin, might select one qualified to act in her stead. Dawson v. Shave,162 Ga. 126 (132 S.E. 912). If a sister, the nearest of kin, may select, it seems to follow indisputably that one having a higher order of preference than a sister may also select. Even if it can be said that the statement in the Rivers case is obiter, and we do not think it is, the ruling in the Dawson case demands, as a logical consequence, the conclusion herein stated. The ruling in the Dawson case can not be sustained, in our judgment, upon any hypothesis other than that the one first entitled to administer may make the selection. Since the widow is the first in order of preference, her selection of a qualified person precludes the right of any other person or persons in a lower order of preference to express any choice or to act as administrator. Dawson v. Shave, supra. Since the appointment of the administrator upon the selection of the widow was the only legal course, and there is no question of his qualification, it is unnecessary to rule on the other contention of the plaintiff in error. The action of the daughters was mere surplusage. The court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial. *Page 134Judgment affirmed. Stephens, P. J., and Sutton, J., concurspecially.

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