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65 N.C. 447

Poe v. . Hardie

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided June 5, 1871

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1871-06-05

Eule for an amercement against the Sheriff of Cumberland ■County, heard before Buxton, J., at' Spring Term, 1871, of Cumberland Superior Court. The plaintiff placed in the hands of the defendant, as Sheriff, .an execution against one Duncan Shaw, based upon a judgment which was obtained upon an ante-war debt. The Sheriff returned thereon, “Deceived April 11th, 1871.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1871-06-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently August 2003

4 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Dick, J.

¶1 The execution in the hands of the Sheriff was issued to satisfy a judgment obtained on the 17th day of March, 1871, upon a debt contracted previous to the adoption of our Constitution.

¶2 The Sheriff failed to levy upon and sell the reversionary interest in a homestead, which had been assigned to the defen dant in the execution; and a motion was made to amerce the Sheriff for his failure to perform, an official duty. This presents the question whether the Act of the 25th of March, 1870, (Acts of 1869-70, chap. 121,page 165) exempting from execution the reversionary interest in homesteads, is in violation of the Constitusion of the United States as “ impairing the obligation of contracts,” (Art. 1, sec. X.)

¶3 The rules of law regulating homestead and personal property exemptions, and the principle upon which they are founded, were elaborately considered by the Court in Hill v. Kesler, 63 N. C., 437. In that case it was decided that “ the provisions *449 of the State Constitution giving a homestead and other exemptions, apply to pre-existing contracts, as well as to such as were entered into afterwards, and do not thereby violate the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in regard to the obligation of contracts.”

¶4 As it was determined that the State had the power to create the homestead, there can be no constitutional objection to the law-making power of the State throwing around the homestead, while it exists, such safe-guards as are necessary for its protection and complete enjoyment.

¶5 The act of the 25th day of March, 1870, is not only constitutional, but it carries out the wise and beneficent policy of the Constitution of the State, in securing a home to a householder and his family beyond the reach of legal process 'on the part of creditors.

¶6 The estate in the homestead, as created by the Constitution, is a determinable fee, and the tenant was not “ impeachable for waste ” even before the passage of the act above referred to. That act was intended to protect the owner of a .homestead against any vexatious litigation which might be instituted by the purchaser of a reversionary interest. Such interest, if sold, would yield but little to an execution creditor in satisfaction ot his debt, and in nine cases out of ten, would be purchased by speculators.

¶7 The entire interest and control of the homestead being now, by law, vested in the holder, encourages him to improve and beautify his home, make it more comfortable for himself and family, and more valuable to creditors at the expiration of the determinable estate. The act also provides that the statute of limitations shall not run against the creditors of the holder of a homestead, during the existence ef the estate.

¶8 The ruling of his Honor in the Court below was correct.

¶9 Pee Cui- iam. Judgment affirmed.

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