majority"> Rodman, J.

This was an indictment against the prisoners tor the murder of Thomas Price.

It contained but a single count, which was in the usual form, except that it 'charged that the prisoners, on the said Price, “ did make an assault, and in some way and manner, and by some means, instruments and weapons, to the jurors .unknown, did then and there, feloniously, wilfully, and of their malice aforethought, deprive him, the said Thomas Price, of life, so that the said Thomas Price did then and there instantly die,” &e. In the course of the trial, the prisoners proposed to ask .of the witnesses examined on the part of the State to prove the homicide, whether the testimony they had given before the ©rand Jury, was the same with that they gave to the jury on the trial then in progress. In reply to a question of the Judge, ■the counsel for the prisoners said, it was not his purpose to impeach the witnesses, by showing that they had testified differently before the Grand Jury. Whereupon, his Honor refused .to allow the question to be put. After a verdict against the *457 prisioners, they moved in arrest of judgment, which was ovex’ruled and they appealed.

The counsel for the prisoners in this Court, in an able argument, has endeavored to maintain, (as we understand him) the following propositions:

1. Assuming it to be known to a Grand Jury, that a homicide was committed in one of a limited number of ways, but not to be known in which one of those ways in particular, the rules of the common law require the indictment to contain separate counts, severally charging the crime to have been committed in one of those ways; and if the indictment, contain in addition to these, a count chai'ging the crime by means unknown, (as it did in Webster’s case) that count is bad and will not support a conviction.

2. Assuming as above, an indictment consisting of a single count only, chai’ging the homicide by means unknown is bad.

3. Upon a trial on an indictment, consisting of such count alone, a prisoner may prove that the means were, or by reasonable inference, might have been known to the Gx’and Jury, and therefore the evidence ought to have been received.

As to the form of the indictment, the learned counsel admitted, that there were two cases of some celebl’ity, which might he cited against him. Commonwealth v. Webster 5 Cushing 295, and State v. Williams, 7 Jones 446. He contested the principle on which these cases were decided, and also endeavored to distinguish them from the present.

Both the decisions.referred to, are entitled to great respect, from the character of the Judges who made them, and one of them, at least, must be regarded as an authority in this State. Nevertheless, as they are comparatively recent, and standalone as far as we know, as decisions on the precise points in question, and have been seriously questioned by the learned counsel, we accept his invitation to consider the question independently of them.

The law requires every indictment to set forth with reason *458 able certainty, the nature and circumstances of the crime. The; reasons for this rule, applicable to the present question, are:

1. That the accused may know with what he is charged, sex as to be prepared with his defence.

2. That in case of a second indictment, ho may be able to plead his former acquittal or conviction.

The limits of the rule are to be measured by the reasons for it, and it will never be stretched to defeat the ends of justice. Ordinarily, an indictment for an injury to property, must describe the property, both by its own name, and the name of its owner ; as in arson, burglary or larceny. Yet in these cases, if the name of the owner be unknown, it will suffice to say so. So on an inj ury to the person, ordinarily it is necessary to name the1 person inj ured; but if his name is unknown, it will suffice to say so., 1 Bish., Cr. Pro. 5297, where many cases arc referred to.. This was settled law and common practice long before the case-of Webster, -which has been called a novelty. But it must be admitted that for every purpose for -which certainty of description is required, it is more important in reference to the description of the person whose goods, or body, may have been the subject of the crime, than any description of the means of killing in an indictment for homicide can be. Certainty in the description of the crime, must be more important than in the means of effecting it, which indeed in most cases, it is not necessary to state at all. Probably one accused of larceny might prove by the alleged owner, that he had lost no such goods : while if the name be omitted, he loses that means of defence. To one charged with the murder of A., he may prove that A. is alive, when he could not prove the same of a person described as unknown. Also it is obvious that one acquitted, or convicted of stealing certain goods, the property of A., and indicted a second time for the same offence, may with much more facility establish the identity of the second charge with the first, than he could if the name of the owner had been stated as unknown.

If certainty may thus, for sufficient reason, be dispensed *459 with in the more important circumstances: a fortiori, it may in the less important.

It is easy to see that under a contrary doctrine, which required the means by which a crime was committed, to be stated with certainty, when they could only be conjectured, a conscientious jury might often fail to agree as to what means were the most probable, and thus the guilty would escape, upon a doubt as to a matter not essential to his guilt.

To dispense with certainty where it is unattainable, cau rarely if ever embarrass a just defence, while to expect it, may defeat the ends of the law.

We think also there can be no doubt, that a prisoner charged the second time with the murder of an individual by any certain means whatever, could avail himself of a former acquittal upon a charge of the murder of the same individual by means unknown. Such a form of indictment would thus in that respect be more advantageous to the prisoner, than one that stated certain means, e. g. by shooting, for he may be again tried upon a charge of murdering by other and different means, e. g. by poisoning.

Both on principle and authority, a count in the form here used is sufficient, and will support a conviction.

Having reached this conclusion, we can see no necessity for the use of other, and additional counts, stating with certainty, the several different means which may be supposed; and no-reason except caution on the part of the pleader, and a desire to avoid the possibility of a variance between the charge, and the proof. For this reason no doubt the additional counts-were inserted in Webster’s case. It is taken to be settled law, that if an indictment charges in different counts, that the crime was committed by several different means, if the jury believe-it’ was committed by either of those means, they' are not obliged to find by which in particular, but may find a general verdict of guilty on all the counts, notwithstanding the means charged n the several counts are inconsistent with each other. State *460 v. Williams, 9 Iredell, 140, State v. Baker, 63 N. C. 276. To the same effect is a very recent case. Carr v. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1 (Mass.)

Now if a jury may convict by a general verdict, which in effect says the crime was committed in one of several ways, but the particular one is unknown, of what advantage is it to a prisoner to have the several'ways which may be conjectured as possible, separately set forth, rather than have them all combined, with no greater certainty in a single count “ by means unknown ?” That charge corresponds with the verdict, and the several counts substantially amount but to that; so it follows that alone should suffice.

Then as to the right of the prisoners to the evidence which was rejected. How it might have been if they had proposed that there was evidence before the grand jury different from that before the petit j urv, and show ing clearly how the homicide was effected, we are not called on to say. It is conceded for the sake of the argument that they would have been entitled to it.

But the counsel for the prisoners did not suggest, that there was before the grand jury any evidence different from that .before the petit j nry. So the question is, whether the evidence .-given upon the trial proved the homicide to have been committed by any certain means, and therefore reasonably tended; •to prove that it was committed by such means, to the exclusion) of all others. If the evidence when admitted, would notl reasonably tend to support the allegation that the grand jury knew the means of the homicide, it was incompetent and properly rejected. Herein, the counsel for the prisoners attempt to distinguish this case from that of Williams in 7 Jones, 446, as in that case no one way of killing was more probabL than another. The difference between the cases in that resped is not so great as to be material. The most that can be said oJ the evidence in this case is, that it proved that probably thi '.'homicide was accomplished in one of four several ways, viz *461 1st, by shooting; 2nd, by worrying by dogs ; 3rd, by bruises made by sticks, stones, or other objects ; 4th, by the combined effect of all these means.

Among these different means we can only conjecture which was the real one, while it is certainly possible, consistently with the evidence, that the real means were different from any of those supposed.

We think therefore the evidence offered did not tend to prove the allegation, and it was properly rejected.

There is no error.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.

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