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65 N.H. 193

20 A 954

Sylvester v. State

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Decided June 5, 1889

Supreme Court of New Hampshire · decided 1889-06-05

Petition, for a writ of certiorari. Facts agreed. September 3, 1887, Sylvester, being prosecuted in tbe police court of Little-ton for being a common seller of spirituous liquor, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and costs, and to be committed to jail one day, with an agreement made by him and the complainant, and assented to by the court, that tbe sentence should not be enforced while be did not sell intoxicating liquor.

Relies on Moses v. Julian · Commonwealth v. John Dowdican's Bail · Thompson v. Ela

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-06-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1987 · most notably Ex parte United States (1916), People Ex Rel. Forsyth v. . Court of Sessions (1894)

4 federal appellate · 35 state decisions — followed in 11 states

8018891890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Dob, C. J.

¶1 “It has long been a common practice in this commonwealth, after verdict of guilty in a criminal case, 'when the court is satisfied that, by reason of extenuating circumstances, or of the pendency of a question of law in a like case before a higher court, or other sufficient cause, public justice does not require an immediate sentence, to order, with the consent of the defendant and of the attorney for the commonwealth, and upon such terms as the court in its discretion may impose, that the indictment be laid on file; and this practice has been recognized by statute. Sts. 1865, a. 223; 1869, c. 415, s. 60. Such an order is not equivalent to a final judgment, or to a nolle prosequi or discontinuance by which the case is put out of court, but is a mere suspending of active proceedings in the case, which dispenses with the necessity of entering formal continuances upon the dockets, and leaves it within the power of the court at any time, upon the motion of either party, to bring the case forward and pass any lawful order or judgment therein.” Com. v. Dowdican’s Bail, 115 Mass. 133, 136.

¶2 J udgment was rendered against Sylvester, in open court, when he was present, September 3, 1887, on his plea of guilty; and the enforcement of the judgment by mittimns was not a punishment for subsequent offences, or for breach of the condition on which execution was stayed. No appeal can be taken in a justice court, except from a judgment (Moses v. Julian, 45 N. H. 52, 60); and the order granting the motion for a mittimus was not a judgment, The police court was satisfied by the evidence that the respondent had sold liquor after September 3. But this conclusion was not a conviction of a criminal offence. It was a mere finding of a fact *196 involved in the interlocutory question whether the execution of the judgment should be further postponed. On this question he was no more entitled to another complaint and warrant, another arrest, a formal summons, personal plea, appeal, or jury trial, than he would have been on a denial of his motion for a temporary stay of mittimus December 11. If the interlocutory motion for a mittimus was triable by any judicial tribunal, the trial and decision belonged to the jurisdiction in which the motion was made. He had an opportunity to be heard, and the evidence was competent in support of the motion. The validity of the first stay, ordered on the third of September, is as immaterial as the validity of the second, ordered on the eleventh of December. . If the first was illegal on either of the grounds suggested by the state, or on the ground that the assent of the attorney-general or solicitor was necessary, the judgment was not invalidated by the illegal delay in its enforcement. If the agreement and plea had been made under any misunderstanding that would entitle the respondent to a change of plea, his remedy would not be by appeal. Thompson v. Ela, 58 N. H. 490, 498.

¶3 Petition denied.

All concurred.
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