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← 65 N.J. 172 - In Re Abrams

In Re Abrams’s Empirical Analysis

1974

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
July 1991
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently July 1991

5 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

120197419801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Fuentes v. Shevin · State v. Begyn · In Re Kamp · New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.R.G. · In Re Greenberg

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The order appealed from had its genesis in an investigation conducted by the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation (“SCI”). In August 1971, appellant, Arthur Lawrence Abrams, and his client Ezra Sensibar refused, on the basis of the Fifth Amendment, to answer certain questions propounded by the SCI. Thereafter, formal immunity was conferred upon them and their subsequent public testimony in October 1971 formed the predicate for the filing of formal charges against Abrams by the Essex County Ethics Committee. At Abrams’ specific request, his testimony and that of Sensibar was made part of the record of the ensuing disciplinary proceeding. Although several charges were initially filed against Abrams, only one charge is now relevant. That charge was as follows: On April 22, 1969, by check bearing that date drawn on his trust account in the National Newark and Essex Bank, in Newark, respondent did pay to Construction Aggregates Corporation the sum of $20,000 allegedly for engineering services which sum respondent well knew would be used by said corporation, or an officer thereof, for an illegal and improper purpose contrary to and in violation of N.J.S. 2A:9S — 6 as a bribe to and to satisfy the extortionate demands of certain public officials of the City of Jersey City.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We are concerned with the respondent, a member of the bar who, apart from his financial interest in the venture, was acting as legal counsel and was bound by the high ethical principles of his profession. Those principles clearly dictated that he play no part whatever in the corrupt $20,000 payment to the public officials of Jersey City. We are entirely satisfied that that respon dent’s participation in the corrupt payment . . . was unethical and calls for some measure of discipline. We agree with the position of respondent’s counsel that . . . disbarment is not called for. But we disagree that “discipline which exceeds reprimand” would be excessive. . . . The determination as to the measure of discipline is difficult and, as we have repeatedly pointed out, “each case must rest largely upon its own particular circumstances.” We have concluded that the respondent’s professional dereliction warrants suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and until further order; judgment to that effect will be entered.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “In Colsey ( 63 N.J. 210 , 306 A.2d 72 ) an attorney was disbarred for knowingly participating in a transaction which involved a corrupt payment to satisfy an illegal demand by a public official. However, unlike the situation here, the attorney was not in any sense a covictim, played a very active part in the corrupt transaction itself and “used the fact that he was a member of the bar as part of the mask for the crime by creating the appearance that a professional fee was involved.” 63 N.J. at 215 , 306 A.2d at 75 . We agree with the position of respondent’s counsel that Colsey is distinguishable and that disbarment is not called for.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.