Wheeler v. Nesbitt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 federal appellate · 13 district · 41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 110 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Undoubtedly every person who puts the criminal law in force maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, commits a wrongful act; and if the accused is thereby prejudiced, either in his person or property, the injury and loss so sustained constitute the proper foundation of an action to recover compensation. Malice alone, however, is not sufficient to sustain the action, because a person actuated by the plainest malice may nevertheless prefer a well-founded accusation, and have a justifiable reason for the prosecution of the charge. "Want of reasonable and probable cause is as much an element in the action for a malicious criminal prosecution as the evil motive which prompted the prosecutor to make the accusation; and though the averment is a negative one in its form and character, it is nevertheless a material element of the action, and must be proved by the plaintiff by some affirmative evidence, unless the defendant dispenses with such proof by pleading singly the truth of the several facts involved in the charge. Morris v. Corson, 7 Cow. [N. Y.] 281. Either of these allegations may be proved by circumstances, .and it is unquestionably true that want of probable cause is evidence of malice, tut it is not the same thing; and unless it is shown that both concurred in the prosecution, or that the one was combined with the other in making or instigating the charge, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in an action of this description.” (Italics supplied.)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Griswold v. Horne · Singh v. Macdonald

2. ““To support an action for a malicious criminal prosecution the plaintiff must prove, in the first place, the fact of prosecution, and that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, or that he instigated its commencement, and that it finally terminated in his acquittal. “He must also prove that the charge preferred against him was unfounded, and that it was made without reasonable or probable cause, and that the defendant, in making or instigating it," was actuated by malice. * * * “The burden of proof in the first instance is upon the plaintiff to make out h'is case, and if he fails to do so in any one of these particulars, the defendant has no occasion to offer any evidence in his defense. * * * “Malice alone, however, is not sufficient to sustain the action; because a person actuated by the plainest malice may, nevertheless, prefer a well-founded accusation, and have a justifiable reason for the prosecution of the charge. “Want of reasonable and probable cause is as much an element in the action * * * as the evil motive * * * and though the averment is a negative one * * * it * * * must be proved by the plaintiff by some affirmative evidence, unless the defendant dispenses with such proof by pleading singly the truth of the several facts involved in the charge.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Nieves v. Bartlett · Dollar Down Furn. Co. v. Blassingame

3. “knowledge of such a state of facts and circumstances as excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on such facts and circumstances, that the [accused] is guilty of the crime of which he is suspected.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Com. v. Jackson · Gordy v. Burns