Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 65 Wis. 2d 596 - McAdoo v. State

65 Wis. 2d 596 - McAdoo v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1974

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
3
states following
August 2011
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 56 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently August 2011 · most notably 96 Wis. 2d 531 - State v. Shaffer (1980), 103 Wis. 2d 228 - State v. Dean (1981)

4 federal appellate · 56 state decisions

31019741980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Stein v. People of State of New York Wissner · Fikes v. State of Alabama · California v. Curry

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““. . . The burden of proof is upon the state to prove every essential element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. The test is not whether this court or any of the members thereof are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, but whether this court can conclude the trier of facts could, acting reasonably, be so convinced by evidence it had a right to believe and accept as true. A criminal conviction can stand based in whole or in part upon circumstantial evidence. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is for the trier of fact. . . .” See also: Bailey v. State (1974), 65 Wis. 2d 331, 353 , 222 N. W. 2d 871 ; McAdoo v. State (1974), 65 Wis. 2d 596, 611 , 223 N. W. 2d 521 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““ ‘. . . [T]he right to interrogate after arrest is limited and must be for the purpose of determining whether to release the suspect or if he has been arrested without a warrant to make a formal complaint. ... A detention for a period longer than is reasonably necessary for such limited purpose violates due process and renders inadmissible any confession obtained during the unreasonable period of the detention.’ “It was further said (p. 535) : “ . While one may be detained by the police and interrogated to secure sufficient evidence to either charge him with a crime or to release him, the police cannot continue to detain an arrested person to “sew up” the case by obtaining or extracting a confession or culpable statements to support the arrest or the guilt. . . .’ “In Krueger v. State (1972), 58 Wis.2d 345, 357 , 192 N.W.2d 880 , this court clarified the Phillips rule against ‘sew-up’ confessions: “ ‘. . . A confession does not become inadmissible as a “sew-up” confession merely because the state, prior to the confession, had information sufficient to sustain a charge. The question revolves solely on the point whether the delay was inordinate and the detention illegal. . . .’ “This rule was recently reiterated in McAdoo v. State (1974), 65 Wis.2d 596, 609 , 223 N.W.2d 521 : “ ‘Any statement, even if voluntarily given by an accused, will be held inadmissible if made during a period of unreasonably long detention. State v. Estrada (1974), 63 Wis.2d 476, 490 , 217 N.W.2d 359 ; ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “A first series of tests was conducted in the morning, starting at about 10:45 a.m. A lunch break was taken and a second series of tests began about 2 p.m. At about 2:25 p.m., the defendant indicated that he wished to discontinue the test. Pursuant to this request, the testing equipment was taken off the defendant, turned off and put away, and the defendant was informed that the test was over. The defendant did not indicate that he did not wish to talk to [the polygraph examiner], who continued to question the defendant. The defendant freely answered and talked for about forty-five minutes. In the course of the conversation he admitted [his crime to the polygraph examiner],”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.